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communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
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 Introduction 
Having information about others equals power.1 Due to the ‘rapid growth of privacy-destroying 
technologies’ privacy and protection of personal data is endangered not only by government 
surveillance, but also by private sector monitoring,2 especially in the online environment. This 
phenomenon has been called ‘multiveillance’, which means ‘surveillance not just by the state 
but by companies, marketers, and those in our social networks’.3 Though, privacy and data 
protection have long been recognised as important and fundamental principles in the modern 
world,4 lawmakers seem to have had challenges to keep up with the rapid technological 
developments and protecting privacy and personal data in the online environment. This can be 
seen from the fact that online data protection in the European Union (hereafter the ‘EU’) is still 
regulated by almost a two decades old legal instrument, the Directive 2002/58/EC (hereafter 
the ‘ePrivacy Directive’),5 which has been amended once during this period.6   
 
Privacy and protection of personal data are fundamental human rights in the EU and 
incorporated in its legislations. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(hereafter the ‘Charter’), which is legally binding on all EU Member States,7 embraces these 
rights in Articles 7 and 8 respectively.8 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,9 
which is one of the two pillars of the EU’s constitution, includes also the right to the protection 
of personal data in Article 16(1).10 The EU’s data protection regime allows, however, the 
 
1 A Michael Froomkin, ‘The Death of Privacy?’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1461, 1462 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2715617> accessed 13 March 2020. 
2 ibid 1463, 1465. 
3 Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age (Oxford University Press 
2015) 5. 
4 Christopher Kuner, ‘Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part I)’ (2010) 18 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 176, 176–177 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ijlit18&i=180> accessed 13 March 2020. 
5 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L 201/37. 
6 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L 337/11. 
7 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306/1 Article 6. 
8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1. 
9 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47; see also 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
10 see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 Article 8 which 
also enshrines the right to privacy. 
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processing of personal data in accordance with law, while at the same time striving to employ 
high level of safety and security requirements to justify the interference with these fundamental 
rights. One such legislation is the famous General Data Protection Regulation (hereafter the 
‘GDPR’ or the ‘Regulation’),11 which came into force on 25 May 2018 and repealed and 
replaced Directive 95/46/EC (hereafter the ‘Data Protection Directive’).12  
 
The European Commission has also proposed a supplementary legislation to the GDPR that 
will provide specific rules with respect to privacy and data protection in the electronic 
communications sector. The forthcoming lex specialis Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (hereafter the ‘ePrivacy Regulation’)13 is still a work in progress and has been 
revised under the different Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (hereafter the 
‘EU Council Presidency’).14 At the time of writing this thesis, the newest revised version of 
the draft ePrivacy Regulation was adopted on 21 February 2020 by the Croatian Presidency.15 
The much awaited ePrivacy Regulation was supposed to come into force at the same time as 
the GDPR, so that the EU would have an updated and comprehensive data protection 
framework in place.16 As a result of the delay the ePrivacy Directive,17 as amended,18 remains 
still in force as the lex specialis law to the GDPR.19 It will be repealed by the proposed ePrivacy 
Regulation once in force, though at the moment it seems that its enactment might be pushed to 
even so far as 2023.20 
 
11 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
12 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 
281/31. 
13 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing 
Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications)’ COM (2017) 10 final. 
14 see for example ‘EPrivacy Regulation’ (e-Privacy European Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications, last updated 30 March 2020) <https://cms.law/en/deu/insight/e-privacy> accessed 5 February 
2020 and; ‘EU EPrivacy Regulation’ (IAPP Resource Center) <https://iapp.org/resources/topics/eu-eprivacy-
regulation/> accessed 5 February 2020. 
15 ‘EU Council Presidency Releases Proposed Amendments to Draft EPrivacy Regulation’ (Privacy & 
Information Security Law Blog, 27 February 2020) <https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2020/02/27/eu-
council-presidency-releases-proposed-amendments-to-draft-eprivacy-regulation/> accessed 1 April 2020. 
16 see ‘Digital Single Market – Stronger Privacy Rules for Electronic Communications’ (European Commission 
- European Commission, 10 January 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_17> accessed 15 April 2020. 
17 ePrivacy Directive. 
18 Citizens’ Rights Directive. 
19 European Commission, ‘Stronger Protection, New Opportunities - Commission Guidance on the Direct 
Application of the General Data Protection Regulation as of 25 May 2018’ (Communication) COM (2018) 43 
final. 
20 ‘EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 14). 
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The internet has been described as ‘an international network of interconnected computers, 
which enables millions of people to communicate with one another in “cyberspace” and to 
access vast amounts of information from around the world’.21 As the use of internet has 
expanded in the 21st century, the privacy risks inherent in this kind of ‘open network’ also 
emerge.22 People are rarely aware of the massive volume of data that is collected and processed 
about them when they access and surf the internet, hence they are being robbed of their freedom 
to make decisions regarding the use of their personal data.23 The internet has traditionally 
employed this kind of invisible processing through ‘privacy-invading features’,24 due to fast 
data flows and by disregarding the rules on informing the users about the processing operations 
and purposes.25 It is important that information about the processing of personal data is brought 
to the attention of internet users as this concerns their fundamental human rights. The EU has 
recognised the importance of protecting privacy and personal data also in the online 
environment and therefore personal data protection is no longer a ‘niche area’ but has extended 
its embrace to almost all fields of law.26  
 
Websites and mobile applications use ‘cookies’, which are a type of technology that enables 
the invisible processing of user’s data.27 It is ‘a computer record of information that is sent 
from a web server to an user’s computer for the purpose of future identification of that 
computer on future visits to the same web site’.28 Cookies can be used for a range of purposes, 
such as, profiling the internet user in order to provide targeted advertisements on the internet.29 
Cookies can thus be very intrusive and contain high-privacy risks. The Article 29 Data 
 
21 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (adopted on 21 November 2000) WP 37 8 
<https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm> accessed 20 
February 2020. 
22 ibid 13. 
23 ibid 47, 73. 
24 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal data, 
‘Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by 
Software and Hardware’ (adopted on 23 February 1999) WP 17 4 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/1999/wp17_en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020. 
25 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 47. 
26 Kuner (n 4) 176. 
27 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal data (n 24) 4; Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on Smart Devices’ (adopted on 27 February 
2013) WP 202 12 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf> accessed 30 March 2020. 
28 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal data (n 24) 4. 
29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 73. 
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Protection Working Party (hereafter the ‘WP29’) has recognised that the ‘Internet is not just a 
worldwide information platform, but also a worldwide market place where competing 
businesses try to attract potential customers’.30 Thus, though protecting user’s personal data is 
crucial as part of their fundamental human rights, the data protection rules must be balanced 
against companies’ economic interests.31  
 
The WP29 has been reformed since the GDPR came into force and is now known as the 
European Data Protection Board (hereafter the ‘EDPB’).32 It is an independent body that has 
an advisory role in the EU’s data protection framework.33 It consists of the heads of the national 
data protection authorities from each Member State.34 The WP29’s opinions, guidelines and 
recommendations on the interpretation of the data protection concepts and rules, most of which 
have been endorsed by the EDPB, are not legally binding.35 Nevertheless, as they are an 
advisory body and one of their functions is to facilitate a harmonised interpretation of the EU’s 
data protection laws,36 companies and organisations are recommended to take into account 
their opinions and guidelines when implementing data protection rules. 
 
Consent is an important concept in data protection and provides one of the justifications for the 
interference with this fundamental right. For example, the Charter has explicitly recognised 
that personal data can be processed only ‘on the basis of the consent of the person concerned 
or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’.37 Consent is also one of the legal bases under 
Article 6(1) of the GDPR that makes processing of personal data lawful. It does not, however, 
take precedence over the other available legal bases in the provision.38 Controllers should 
consider on a case by case basis, which one of the six options under Article 6(1) will be the 
most appropriate legal ground for the processing in question.39 It should be noted, however, 
 
30 ibid 73. 
31 ibid 19. 
32 see GDPR Article 68. 
33 see Data Protection Directive Article 29; GDPR Articles 68-70; ‘About EDPB’ (European Data Protection 
Board - European Data Protection Board, 10 January 2018) <https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-
edpb_en> accessed 8 May 2020. 
34 see Data Protection Directive Article 29; GDPR Article 68. 
35 see ‘About EDPB’ (n 33). 
36 GDPR Article 70; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - 
An Integrated EU Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 90. 
37 the Charter Article 8(2). 
38 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent’ (adopted on 13 
July 2011) WP 187 7–8 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020. 
39 ibid. 
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that Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive has made consent a prerequisite before cookies can 
be placed on a user’s device. The legislator’s decision to use consent for cookies has sparked 
criticism and debate among scholars on whether consent is de facto effective in protecting 
personal data in the online environment.40 Another issue with the ePrivacy Directive is that as 
EU directives must be implemented into national law by each Member State, this generally 
results in some varying rules and differing interpretations of the EU law on national level.41 
Thus, the definition of what amounts to valid ‘consent’ with respect to cookies may also vary 
between Member States.42  
 
Transparency is also a pivotal principle in the EU data protection law.43 It is a principle in itself 
but also part of the conditions for a valid consent, since a data subject must be informed of the 
processing of personal data, before he or she can provide an effective consent under the GDPR 
and the ePrivacy Directive.44 Thus, consent must be based on prior information. Providing 
transparency is deemed to invoke user’s trust and better data protection as it is easier to hold 
companies accountable for misconduct.45 On the other hand, too much transparency can also 
be overwhelming and as a result become an obstacle in ensuring good data protection. For 
instance, academics have criticised transparency as being deceptive and they have considered 
it as one of the stumbling blocks in obtaining valid consent.46 
 
40 see for example Marcin Betkier, Privacy Online, Law and the Effective Regulation of Online Services 
(Intersentia 2019); Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Informed Consent: We Can Do Better to Defend Privacy’ 
(2015) 13 IEEE Security Privacy 103 <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7085952> accessed 20 February 
2020; Sheng Yin Soh, ‘Privacy Nudges: An Alternative Regulatory Mechanism to Informed Consent for Online 
Data Protection Behaviour’ (2019) 5 European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL) 65 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/edpl5&i=71> accessed 24 March 2020; Alessandro Mantelero, 
‘The Future of Consumer Data Protection in the E.U. Re-Thinking the “Notice and Consent” Paradigm in the 
New Era of Predictive Analytics’ (2014) 30 Computer Law & Security Review 643 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026736491400154X> accessed 26 February 2020. 
41 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent’ (n 38) 36. 
42 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (adopted on 2 October 2013) WP 208 3 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp208_en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020. 
43 see for example Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 
2016/679’ (as last revised and adopted on 11 April 2018) WP 260 rev.01 para 2 
<https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/20180413_Article29WPTransparencyGuidelinespdf.pdf> accessed 
26 February 2020. 
44 see GDPR Articles 4(11) and 5(1)(a); ePrivacy Directive Article 5(3). 
45 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 43) 
para 2 and 4. 
46 see for example Jenna Lindqvist, Personal Data Protection on the Internet of Things: An EU Perspective 
(University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law 2018); Ida Koivisto, ‘The Anatomy of Transparency: The Concept and 
Its Multifarious Implications’ (European University Institute 2016) Working Paper MWP 2016/09 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/41166> accessed 17 March 2020; Ryan Calo, ‘Against Notice Skepticism in 
Privacy (and Elsewhere)’ (2012) 87 Notre Dame Law Review 1027 
<https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol87/iss3/3/> accessed 18 February 2020; Eoin Carolan, ‘The Continuing 
Problems with Online Consent under the EU’s Emerging Data Protection Principles’ (2016) 32 Computer Law 
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1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION, STRUCTURE AND SCOPE 
The overarching research question for this thesis is whether or not the traditional model of 
consent and notice is the appropriate legal basis for the use of cookies. The research question 
is divided into the following parts: 
 
i) Are consent and notice an effective tool in providing control and protection to 
individuals in the context of personal data processed through internet cookies? 
ii) Does the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive provide clear and harmonised rules on 
cookie consents and notices? 
 
The focus of this thesis is website cookies used on computers. It does not include in its scope 
cookies used in applications downloaded on mobile devices. This research discusses cookies 
in general and does not distinguish between the different uses, though some scholarly articles 
used in this thesis as source material focus mainly on cookies used for online tracking or 
behavioural advertising. These include articles by authors, such as, professor Borgesius,47 
researcher Clifford,48 and professors Tene and Polonetsky.49 Additionally, the thesis will focus 
only on the general issue of consent and transparency with respect to cookies and will not 
consider any special areas, such as, children or vulnerable people. Furthermore, the notion of 
consent as used in other fields of law, such as, contract law is not included in the scope of this 
research as the research is restricted to data protection. This thesis will use the term ‘regular 
consent’ when distinguishing Article 6(1)(a) consent from Article 9(2)(a) ‘explicit consent’ of 
the GDPR. Furthermore, the analysis on the effectiveness of privacy notices in subchapter 4.2. 
is used as a reflection on the issue of traditional notices in general including cookie notices. 
 
After this introductory chapter the thesis will present in chapter 2 the definition and purposes 
of cookies and outline the legal framework examined in this thesis. In chapter 3 the reader is 
 
& Security Review 462 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364916300322> accessed 26 
February 2020. 
47 Borgesius (n 40); Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Personal Data Processing for Behavioural Targeting: 
Which Legal Basis?’ (2015) 5 International Data Privacy Law 163 
<https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/5/3/163/730611> accessed 21 February 2020. 
48 Damian Clifford, ‘EU Data Protection Law and Targeted Advertising: Consent and the Cookie Monster - 
Tracking the Crumbs of Online User Behaviour’ (2014) 5 JIPITEC <http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-3-
2014/4095> accessed 26 February 2020. 
49 Omer Tene and Jules Polenetsky, ‘To Track or Do Not Track: Advancing Transparency and Individual 
Control in Online Behavioral Advertising’ (2012) 13 Minn JL Sci & Tech 281 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/mipr13&i=281> accessed 20 March 2020. 
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introduced to the concept of consent and the principle of transparency. Subchapters 3.1-3.6 
discuss consent, its different components and supplementary elements. The requirements of 
valid consent have not changed drastically as the main elements are still freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous indication, but the GDPR has clarified that active behaviour is key. 
There is, however, some ambiguity between the difference of ‘regular consent’ under Article 
6(1)(a) and ‘explicit consent’ under Article 9(2)(a) of the GDPR, which is explored in 
subchapter 3.7. This thesis will then introduce in subchapters 3.8 and 3.9 the transparency 
principle and controller’s information obligation respectively, which in essence is the tool to 
comply with the transparency principle under the data protection regime. Subchapter 3.10 
provides a short conclusion to the chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss whether or not consent and notice provide an effective protection 
mechanism to internet users with respect to cookies. It will be seen that cookie consents and 
notices are burdened by many factors as evidenced by behavioural economics, cognitive and 
structural problems, as well as other factors. It is concluded, therefore, that cookie consents 
and notices in their traditional form are not an effective tool in providing control and data 
protection to internet users. Hence, consent and notice might not always be the appropriate 
legal basis for processing data obtained through cookies. Nevertheless, consent and notice are 
so enshrined in the EU’s data protection regime that they seem to be here to stay. This thesis 
is, however, not of the opinion that consent should be disregarded altogether with respect to 
cookies, but that the consent and notice mechanisms should be improved.   
 
Chapter 5 will then look at practical examples to see how and if websites have complied with 
cookie consent and notice obligations. It will be seen that cookie rules are interpreted 
inconsistently by websites, which has resulted in noncompliance in some instances. Hence, it 
can be inferred from the results that the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive have, at least to a 
certain extent, failed to harmonise cookie consents and notices. Therefore, there is room for 
improvement in terms of clarifying and harmonizing cookie rules. Additionally, some websites 
do not provide a real choice when requesting consent, hence data subject’s control over his or 
her personal data becomes illusory. Thus, it is questionable whether another legal basis, such 
as, legitimate interest might be more suitable in these circumstances. 
 
Chapter 6 will look at the future of cookie regulation in terms of discussing briefly the proposed 
ePrivacy Regulation to the extent that it is applicable to the discussion of website cookies. It 
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will look more closely at the issue with ‘cookie walls’, which basically coerces website users 
to accept cookies or otherwise they will be denied access to the site or service. This thesis will 
argue that cookie walls should be prohibited completely, with strict exceptions if needed, since 
it is unfair to force user’s hand in accepting cookies. This could not be considered as freely 
given consent. The latest revised draft of the ePrivacy Regulation has introduced an alternative 
legal basis to consent for cookies, which is the legitimate interest ground. This thesis applauds 
the EU Council Presidency for its efforts to bring forth another legal basis with regards to the 
use of cookies, since consent might not always be an effective tool nor the appropriate one. 
Lastly, chapter 7 will provide an overall conclusion to this thesis. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a research of the legal doctrine of the EU’s data protection law focusing mainly 
on the provisions and recitals of the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive, hence contributing to 
the de lege lata50 discussion of these two important legal instruments on the EU level. 
Accordingly, this thesis uses mainly the legal doctrinal method. This thesis provides also some 
discussion on the de lege ferenda51 proposed ePrivacy Regulation to the extent that it is 
applicable to the discussion of website cookies in this thesis. Thus, the research will not provide 
an in-depth analysis of the draft ePrivacy Regulation as a whole but will look at it only within 
the parameters of this thesis’ topic. 
 
Legal doctrine has been described as ‘research that aims to give a systematic exposition of the 
principles, rules and concepts governing a particular legal field or institution and analyses the 
relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving unclarities and 
gaps in the existing law’.52 The centre of legal doctrinal method is the analysis of existing law 
and the content of its legal norms,53 in order to explore how citizens should de facto act within 
 
50 Antti Kolehmainen, ‘Tutkimusongelma Ja Metodi Lainopillisessa Työssä’ in Tarmo Miettinen (ed), 
Oikeustieteellinen opinnäyte: artikkeleita oikeustieteellisten opinnäytteiden vaatimuksista, metodista ja 
arvostelusta (Edita Publishing Oy 2016) 108. Kolehmainen stated that when interpreting de lege lata legislation 
the ‘interpretation recommendations are based on the sources of law doctrine’. 
51 ibid. When interpreting de lege ferenda legal instruments, Kolehmainen stated that ‘reflections can be made 
more freely, for example on the basis of a consideration of social expediency’. 
52 Jan M Smits, ‘What Is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’ (Social 
Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2644088 5 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2644088> accessed 8 April 2020. 
53 Ari Hirvonen, Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan (Helsingin yliopisto, Oikeustieteellinen 
tiedekunta 2011) 21–22. 
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a legal system in accordance with the law.54 The purpose of legal doctrine is to interpret and 
systematise law.55 Systematisation provides both a practical and theoretical dimension to legal 
doctrine, which are interlinked.56 This thesis will discuss the issue of consent and transparency 
in the online environment with respect to internet cookies on a theoretical and practical level, 
thereby providing a comparison between law in books and law in action.  
 
Concrete examples of website cookie consent and notice mechanisms are used through 
screenshots in order to demonstrate law in action. This is not a quantitative empirical research 
due to the limited amounts of examples used. Instead this thesis uses qualitative empirical 
evidence in order to support its hypothesis. The thesis examines the cookie consent requests in 
the examples, but it will not provide an in-depth analysis of the full cookie notices. Instead, it 
will look more at the compact text accompanying the cookie consent requests, as this tends to 
be the first information that users see with respect to cookies.  
 
Due to limited space only ten examples are used, five for each category. The websites selected 
are a) national data protection authorities and b) law firms in Finland, in order to show that 
even among law firms in Finland and data protection authorities across the EU there is, to a 
certain extent, a lack of consensus with respect to cookie practices. The examples support the 
second hypothesis regarding the inconsistency of cookie consents and notices, despite 
harmonization attempts by the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive. This thesis does 
acknowledge that the results are limited, since the selected websites represent only the legal 
sector and public supervisory authorities. Social media platforms, newspaper sites and third 
party advertisers could have provided additional insight into the diverse cookie practices and 
cookie compliance issues in other sectors. The above mentioned websites were chosen, 
however, because this thesis considers it interesting to examine how the legal sector and the 
public supervisory authorities have interpreted and tackled this issue of cookies and cookie 
consent requests, especially since they are the ones giving companies and organisations legal 
advice and enforcing the rules respectively. 
 
 
54 Jaakko Husa, Kirjoitetaan Juridiikkaa: Ohjeita Oikeustieteellisten Kirjallisten Töiden Laatijoille (2., uud p, 
Talentum 2008) 20. 
55 Hirvonen (n 53) 22. 
56 ibid 25. 
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The national data protection authorities were chosen on the basis that a) they use cookies,57 and 
b) in order to show how data protection authorities in different parts of the EU have reacted 
and implemented cookie consent mechanisms. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy in 
the implementations. This inconsistency is burdensome for companies and organizations who 
operate on a multinational level, because their websites in different countries must also adhere 
to the local laws. If the Member States are not in consensus of what constitutes the correct 
cookie practices under the EU data protection laws, then this will be very onerous on the 
companies, who must tailor their cookie practices in accordance with all the national laws 
where they operate their websites. Additionally, the fact that even law firms in Finland apply 
different cookie practices may very well result in the giving of different advices to companies 
on cookie policies and practices within the country. The law firms were chosen on the basis 
that they are multinational in nature but have at least one office in Finland, in order to show 
that even big law firms interpret cookie rules differently. 
 
Legal interpretation is a key method in legal doctrine.58 Nevertheless, interpretation suffers 
always from some level of bias and can thus never be completely objective.59 This thesis 
applies legal interpretation in its analysis of the legal norms in the EU’s data protection regime 
using legal sources as the basis for its legal construction. Legal sources have different levels of 
weight in the legal doctrine depending on the category that they fall in to.60 In the Finnish legal 
system legal sources are commonly divided into a) strongly binding, which include, inter alia, 
legislation and case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the ‘CJEU’), 
b) weakly binding, such as, legislative preparatory documents, and c) permitted legal sources, 
such as, general legal principles, ethical and moral principles and comparative arguments.61  
 
This thesis uses WP29’s opinions and guidelines, since they have an advisory role in the data 
protection framework by interpreting the provisions in the EU’s data protection legislations 
and providing clarifications and best practices. Additionally, this thesis makes use of academic 
 
57 Not all supervisory authorities use cookies on their websites, e.g. the Finnish and the Irish data protection 
authorities do not use cookies, at least at the time of writing this thesis. See ‘Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto’ 
(Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto) <https://tietosuoja.fi/etusivu> accessed 3 March 2020; ‘Homepage | Data 
Protection Commission’ (Homepage | Data Protection Commission) <https://www.dataprotection.ie/> accessed 
22 April 2020. 
58 Hirvonen (n 53) 36. 
59 ibid 37; Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Miten Lakia Tulkitaan? – Erään Oikeusteoreettisen Kysymyksen 
Suomalaista Historiaa (Lakimies 2011) 297. 
60 Kolehmainen (n 50) 116. 
61 ibid 116–117. 
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debate surrounding consent and transparency, in order to give teeth to the discussion and 
criticism of their legal complexities in the online environment. When interpreting the notions 
of consent and transparency this thesis uses constructive method, which is applicable when 
deducing concepts in legal doctrine.62   
 
The purpose of comparative law is to analyse distinct legal systems or national laws and it is 
an independent legal area,63 though it can also be used as a support tool in the legal doctrinal 
method.64 This thesis will focus on EU law and will not include in its scope national 
implementations of EU legal instruments. Hence, this thesis will not incorporate comparative 
law method in its sphere of study. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this thesis does use cookie 
practices of different national data protection authorities as part of its qualitative empirical 
evidence in order to demonstrate law in action, but it will not provide a comparison or an in-
depth analysis of the distinct national laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 Hirvonen (n 53) 45. 
63 ibid 26. 
64 Husa (n 54) 23. 
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 Cookies 
2.1 DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF COOKIES 
Cookies have been described as ‘pieces of data that can be stored in text files that may be put 
on the internet user’s hard disk, while a copy may be kept by the website’.65 The cookie will 
then stay on the user’s device for the amount of time that the cookie is programmed to and 
collect information about the user for the website’s different purposes.66 Cookies can collect 
information about, for example, the pages the user has viewed, advertisements that have been 
clicked and any other information that the website is interested in knowing about the user.67 
Some cookies have a more practical role, such as, enabling the proper functioning of the 
website, or facilitating the services provided by the website,68 or combatting fraud and abuse.69 
Cookies are also used to remember, for example,  language preferences, items in the shopping 
basket70 and other actions or preferences conducted on the website by the user or visitor.71 
 
Cookies may be considered invasive, because they can contain a unique id that is stored on the 
user’s computer and that recognises the user whenever he or she returns to the website.72 Thus, 
cookies enable ‘invisible processing’ of user’s personal data by website operators without the 
user’s knowledge.73 The unique identifier in cookies enables the personalisation of website 
user’s information74 and thus the website can ‘keep track of a user’s patterns and preferences’.75 
Due to this, cookies can also be used to create online user profiles for the purpose of targeted 
advertisement on the internet.76 As Clifford has stated ‘tracking and the resulting profiling have 
become a key part of the business model of many Web 2.0 services’.77 This is because targeted 
 
65 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 16. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid. 
69 see for example ‘Microsoft Privacy Statement – Microsoft Privacy’ <https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/privacystatement#maincookiessimilartechnologiesmodule> accessed 28 February 2020. 
70 Digital Power, ‘What Is a Cookie?’ (21 June 2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I01XMRo2ESg> 
accessed 18 February 2020. 
71 Case C-673/17 Planet49 GmbH v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – 
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV [2019] OJ C 413, Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 37. 
72 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 16, 42; Digital Power (n 70). 
73 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 21. 
74 ibid 42. 
75 ibid 93. 
76 ibid 73. 
77 Clifford (n 48) 194. 
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advertisement is a financial resource to website service providers, which enables them to offer 
many of their online services without monetary payment but instead in exchange for the user’s 
personal data.78  
 
There are different types of cookies and some are distinguished by their duration.79 ‘Session 
cookies’ are cookies that exist during the browser session and are ‘automatically deleted when 
the user closes his browser’.80 Hence, they are less intrusive than persistent cookies.81 
‘Persistent cookies’, on the other hand, are stored on the user’s device until their programmed 
expiration date.82 Persistent cookies can last for minutes, days, or even several years.83 
Retention periods that last for several years can be considered as unreasonably long.84 
Persistent cookies enable user’s actions or preferences to be recollected ‘across a site (or across 
different websites)’, hence are more intrusive.85 The Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis report, 
conducted by the WP29 in 2015, showed that the participating websites used a lot more 
persistent cookies than session cookies with a ratio of about 86% and 14% respectively.86 
 
Cookies can also be differentiated by their domain, such as, first party and third party cookies.87 
First-party cookies are those cookies that a business stores and reads ‘on its own website’.88 
These type of cookies are usually functional in nature, for example, they store information 
 
78 Borgesius (n 40) 103. 
79 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 42. 
80 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (adopted on 7 
June 2012) WP 194 4 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp194_en.pdf> accessed 23 November 2019. 
81 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 42, 80. 
82 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (n 80) 4. 
83 ibid; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis - Report’ 
(adopted on 3 February 2015) WP 229 <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=640605> accessed 26 February 2020. The report found that the longest cookie was set to 
7991 years and some were set to over 100 and 1000 years. As for third party cookies the longest was set for 
7985 years and some were set for over 68 years and others for over 10 years. However, if the cookies with over 
100 years of duration are excluded, the average lifespan of a cookie was nevertheless 1-2 years. 
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis’ (n 83) 19. 
85 ‘What Are Cookies and Similar Technologies?’ (Information Commissioner’s Office, 14 November 2019) 
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/guidance-on-the-use-of-cookies-and-similar-
technologies/what-are-cookies-and-similar-technologies/> accessed 23 November 2019. 
86 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis’ (n 83) 8. 
87 Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 40. 
88 Christina Markou, ‘Behavioural Advertising and the New “EU Cookie Law” as a Victim of Business 
Resistance and a Lack of Official Determination’ in Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul De Hert (eds), 
Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection (Springer 
Netherlands 2016) 216 original emphasis. 
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about user’s preferences, for example, login details89 or language preferences.90 Third party 
cookies are, on the other hand, cookies that are stored by a third party, usually an advertising 
network agency, who has made agreements with various websites and shows advertisements 
on those websites.91 The results from the Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis report showed 
that 70% of cookies used by the 478 participating websites were third party cookies.92 Third-
party cookies are more privacy invasive than first-party cookies, because they ‘track users 
across a number of websites and collect information on their behaviour in multiple domains. 
As a result, they enable the construction of particularly detailed user profiles’.93  
 
As seen from the survey, website operators tend to use the more privacy intrusive cookies. This 
could be considered as evidence of deficient data protection rules in terms of cookies, which 
has resulted in the common use of privacy invasive cookie technology by website services. 
Nevertheless, though cookies can be intrusive they can also be very useful as discussed above. 
Even the WP29 has acknowledged that some cookies may be necessary and thus rejecting ‘all 
cookies might not be in the interest of the Internet user’.94 Furthermore, though cookies can 
contain massive amount of information about the user to whom it attaches the unique identifier 
to, only the website placing the cookie on the user’s computer can read it.95 
 
2.2 COOKIE REGULATION IN THE EU  
2.2.1 The GDPR  
The GDPR came into force on 25 May 2018 and is a lex generalis legislation concerning the 
protection of personal data. The Regulation is applicable to both offline and online processing 
of personal data.96 Any data that is categorised as ‘personal data’ will fall under the scope of 
the GDPR, subject to few exceptions, such as, if individual processes personal data for purely 
household reasons.97 The definition of personal data under the GDPR is wide and encompasses 
any information that relates to an ‘identified or identifiable natural person’, in other words, the 
 
89 Clifford (n 48) 195. 
90 see for example ‘Microsoft Privacy Statement – Microsoft Privacy’ (n 69). 
91 Markou (n 88) 216. 
92 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis’ (n 83) 2, 5 and 6. 
93 Markou (n 88) 216. 
94 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU 
Approach to On-Line Data Protection’ (n 21) 80 original emphasis. 
95 Digital Power (n 70). 
96 see GDPR Article 2. 
97 see ibid. 
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data subject, whether directly or indirectly.98 Online identifiers are explicitly mentioned in the 
provision as examples of ‘personal data’.99  
 
As mentioned above, cookies can contain identification numbers that remember the user’s 
device and they can contain a lot of information about the user. Thus, cookies tend to process 
personal data.100 Consequently, the GDPR applies also to data processed via cookies if such 
data falls under the concept of personal data. Furthermore, the WP29 recognised already under 
the Data Protection Directive that identification of a person can be achieved, not just by 
knowing a person’s name but also ‘when other “identifiers” are used to single someone out’.101 
Thus, this interpretation seems to have covered cookie identifiers in its definition of personal 
data already in the pre-GDPR era.  
2.2.2 The ePrivacy Directive  
The ePrivacy Directive, which came into force on 31 July 2002, is a lex specialis legislation to 
the GDPR as it regulates privacy in the electronic communications sector.102 It covers also the 
use of cookies and similar devices, which are permitted, provided that they have a legitimate 
purpose and users must be aware of such use.103 The ePrivacy Directive is applicable to cookies 
regardless if the cookie data is considered personal data or not. This is confirmed by Recital 
24, which states that users’ device and any information that it contains are ‘part of the private 
sphere of the users requiring protection’. Thus, if a company processes personal data through 
cookies, it must comply both with the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive.    
 
The ePrivacy Directive, before its amendment in 2009, did not contain consent as a requirement 
for the processing of data through cookies. Instead Article 5(3) permitted the usage of cookies 
on the condition that users are informed of the processing and have a right to refuse the 
placement and storage of cookies on their terminal equipment.104 Thus, the original version of 
 
98 ibid Article 4(1). 
99 ibid. 
100 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 5–6. 
101 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data’ (adopted on 20 
June 2007) WP 136 14 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf> accessed 17 April 2020. 
102 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent’ (n 38) 28. 
103 ePrivacy Directive Recitals 24 and 25. 
104 see also ibid Recital 25. 
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the ePrivacy Directive provided for an opt-out mechanism for cookie usage by websites.105 The 
provision was later amended and the new wording explicitly required that subscribers or users 
give their prior consent to the use and storage of cookies on their device after having been 
informed of the purposes of the processing.106 Thus, the legislators provided higher protection 
to users by making substantial amendments to this provision regarding the use of cookies107 
and changed the approach from an opt-out mechanism to an opt-in one.108  
 
The amendment has, however, been criticised for not effectuating actual change in online 
business practices with respect to the use of cookies, especially in behavioural advertising.109 
Hence, the common practice of businesses, even after the significant change in the provision 
text, was to continue with opt-out methods instead of prior user consent. This is supported by 
the Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis report, which found that only 50% of the sites requested 
consent for the storage of cookies, while the other 50% merely stated that cookies would be 
used on the website.110 Hence, websites’ cookie practices do not seem to provide sufficient 
control to users, since half of them failed completely to comply with the legal requirement of 
prior opt-in consent. This poses a risk to data subject’s fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection. 
 
It has been argued by Markou that the amendment improved only the information to be 
provided and displayed.111 Hence, cookie information is not hidden anymore in the general 
privacy policies of businesses.112 He also argued that the lack of change in practice is due to 
resistance and hostility from businesses, bad publicity and absence of enforcement actions by 
EU officials, national governments and data protection authorities.113 Furthermore, the lack of 
consistent guidance by the WP29 and national regulators, such as, the ICO have ‘muddled the 
waters’,114 as they took a stricter approach in their earlier guidance on Article 5(3), but became 
business friendlier in their later guidance.115  
 
105 Markou (n 88) 214, 221. 
106 see Citizens’ Rights Directive Article 2(5). 
107 Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 53. 
108 Markou (n 88) 214. 
109 see Markou (n 88). 
110 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis’ (n 83) 18. 
111 Markou (n 88) 226. 
112 ibid. 
113 ibid 227, 238–239. 
114 ibid 238. 
115 ibid 223–239, 240–241. 
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Another reason for the failure of Article 5(3) to bring effective change is due to 
implementations of the ePrivacy Directive on national level.116 Fieldfisher compiled a table of 
national  implementations in the 31 Member States belonging to the European Economic Area 
(hereafter the ‘EEA’) and identified whether or not the countries had implemented prior 
consent requirements as envisaged by the amendments to the provision.117 The table, compiled 
in 2013 and amended in 2015, shows that only six EEA Member States incorporated prior 
consent into their national law. As a result, it is not strange that online businesses have 
continued the traditional practice of an opt-out system with respect to their cookie use. This 
issue can be rectified by the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, which does not require any national 
implementation of the law but will be directly applicable as its counterpart the GDPR.  
 
Consequently, the burden will fall on national data protection authorities to take enforcement 
actions and not remain passive. Enforcement actions can provide incentive for companies to 
start making their cookie practices compliant. For example, the Dutch data protection authority 
published its investigations and findings on YD advertising agency’s cookie practices for 
targeted advertisement and decided that an opt-out mechanism for cookies was in contrast to 
the national law requirements.118 As a result of this publication many companies took the 
initiative to change their cookie policies, incorporate opt-in systems and remove ‘cookie walls’, 
which prevented users from accessing the website content unless they consented to the use of 
cookies.119 Hence, this shows that enforcement actions can be effective in practice.  
 
Additionally, a report by TRUSTe and Fieldfisher shows that from 2009-2013 ‘there was no 
meaningful enforcement of the EU’s new cookie consent law’.120 Consequently, many 
companies decided to halt their cookie compliance programs ‘in order to prioritize more 
pressing compliance risks’.121 Hence, this also supports the argument that active enforcement 
of cookie rules may be the key that triggers online businesses to change their practices and 
 
116 ibid 236, 241. 
117 Fieldfisher, ‘Cookie “Consent” Rule: EEA Implementation’ (Field Fisher Waterhouse) 
<https://res.cloudinary.com/fieldfisher/image/upload/v1574345727/PDF-
Files/PDFs%20from%20old%20website/EU-Cookie-Consent-Tracking-Table-Fieldfisher-21-April-
2015_fzwqve.pdf> accessed 18 February 2020. 
118 Ronald Leenes and Eleni Kosta, ‘Taming the Cookie Monster with Dutch Law – A Tale of Regulatory 
Failure’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 317, 332 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364915000059> accessed 26 February 2020. 
119 ibid. 
120 TRUSTe and Fieldfisher, ‘EU Cookie Audits: Are You Ready?’ 6 <https://iapp.org/resources/article/eu-
cookie-audits-are-you-ready/> accessed 18 February 2020. 
121 ibid. 
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implement appropriate cookie consents. National data protection authorities have been more 
active in recent years in bringing enforcement actions under the GDPR.122 Thus, it is hoped 
that they will expand this initiative to cookie compliance as well as soon as possible.   
 
2.3 EXCEPTIONS TO COOKIE CONSENT 
Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive provides also for exemptions to the requirement of cookie 
consent. The provision excludes cookies from the consent requirement if they are used for i) 
‘technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a 
communication over an electronic communications network’, or ii) ‘as strictly necessary in 
order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber 
or user to provide the service’.123 This is also emphasised in the Directive 2009/136/EC, which 
amended, inter alia, the ePrivacy Directive (hereafter the ‘Citizens’ Rights Directive’). Recital 
66 provides that cookie consent and notice is not needed in ‘those situations where the technical 
storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific 
service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user’.124 Hence, the ePrivacy Directive 
recognises that websites do not need to obtain consent for all cookies, but only for the 
inessential ones, in other words, cookies which are not necessary for the provision of the 
website services.125 These cookies might provide additional perks to the website operator if 
accepted by the user,126 but the website can operate and provide its services even without them.  
 
The WP29 considered, inter alia, that first party user-input session cookies,127 authentication 
session cookies,128 user centric security cookies,129 multimedia player session cookies130 and 
 
122 see for example ‘GDPR Enforcement Tracker - List of GDPR Fines’ <http://www.enforcementtracker.com> 
accessed 2 March 2020. 
123 see Article 2(5) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive amending Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. 
124 ibid Recital 66. 
125 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 6. 
126 ibid. 
127 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (n 80) 6. These 
cookies ‘are typically used to keep track of the user’s input when filling online forms over several pages, or as a 
shopping cart, to keep track of the items the user has selected by clicking on a button (e.g. “add to my shopping 
cart”)’. 
128 ibid. ‘Authentication cookies are used to identify the user once he has logged in (example: on an online 
banking website). These cookies are needed to allow users to authenticate themselves on successive visits to the 
website and gain access to authorized content, such as viewing their account balance, transactions, etc.’. 
129 ibid 7. These are ‘cookies set for the specific task of increasing the security of the service that has been 
explicitly requested by the user. This is the case for example for cookies used to detect repeated failed login 
attempts on a website, or other similar mechanisms designed to protect the login system from abuses’. 
130 ibid. ‘Multimedia player session cookies are used to store technical data needed to play back video or audio 
content, such as image quality, network link speed and buffering parameters’. 
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user interface customization cookies (such as, language preference cookies)131 would be 
exempted from consent under Article 5(3).132 On the other hand, tracking cookies, behavioural 
advertising and analytics cookies, especially third-party analytics cookies would always need 
user’s consent.133 The WP29, however, recognised that first-party cookies used for anonymized 
and aggregated statistical purposes ‘are not likely to create a privacy risk’.134 Thus, it 
recommended that legislators would add this as a third exemption in case the cookie consent 
provision will be addressed in the future.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 ibid 8. ‘User interface customization cookies are used to store a user’s preference regarding a service across 
web pages and not linked to other persistent identifiers such as a username’. 
132 ibid 6–8. 
133 ibid 9–10. 
134 ibid 10. 
135 ibid 11. 
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 Consent and Transparency 
3.1 CONSENT 
The notion of consent ‘has roots in ancient Roman contract law’, but since then it has extended 
its presence to other legal fields136 and is quite a prominent tool in today’s regime of privacy 
and data protection in the EU. Consent is recognised as a key element in data protection even 
on an international level.137  
 
Consent has long been considered as a lawful ground in the EU’s data protection framework 
based on which processing of personal data can become legitimate if correctly used.138 For 
example, the Data Protection Directive Article 7(a) had already recognised in 1995 consent as 
one possible legal ground for processing personal data. This has now been replaced by Article 
6(1)(a) of the GDPR, which continues to include consent as one of the six legal bases for 
processing personal data.139 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Charter has cemented the prominence 
of consent in the EU’s data protection regime,140 by explicitly recognizing consent as a legal 
basis that legitimizes processing of personal data.  
 
The requirements for a valid consent have not changed much over the course of EU’s legislative 
history on data protection.141 Conditions for a valid consent are currently laid down in Articles 
4(11) and 7 of the GDPR. Consent is defined as ‘any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by 
a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to 
him or her’.142 The definition of consent under the GDPR is thus very similar to the one in the 
 
136 Riikka Koulu, Dispute Resolution and Technology: Revisiting the Justification of Conflict Management 
(COMI 2016) 257, 259. 
137 Borgesius (n 40) 104; see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data’ (2013) 14 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm> accessed 22 February 2020. The Collection 
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Data Protection Directive.143 Consequently, the GDPR has not made any radical changes to the 
central elements of consent, but instead incorporated the WP29’s recommendations.144 
 
The concept of consent referred to in the ePrivacy Directive is defined in Article 2(f) and 
complemented by Recital 17. These provisions refer to the definition of consent in the Data 
Protection Directive, which has been replaced by the GDPR. Hence, the requirements for valid 
consent under the ePrivacy Directive are the same as under the GDPR. Consequently, the 
elements of freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous must also be present when 
website operators ask users for consent with respect to the use of cookies in order to constitute 
a valid consent.145 The requirements of consent under the GDPR will also be applicable to the 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation.146  
 
The reason why the conditions for consenting to processing of personal data are quite 
demanding is because the data subject by consenting to the processing of his or her personal 
data is at the same time ‘waiving a fundamental right’.147 Nevertheless, the data subject should 
be able to retain control over the use made of his or her personal data, which is why the element 
of control is also an aspect of valid consent. Furthermore, such control means also that the data 
subject should be able to withdraw his or her consent for future processing.148 Hence, 
individual’s right to self-determination and consent are inextricably linked as the ‘autonomy 
of the data subject is both a pre-condition and a consequence of consent: it gives the data subject 
influence over the processing of data’.149 As described above, the main requirements of a valid 
consent under the EU data protection framework are freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication. These requirements are analysed in detail below. 
 
 
143 Consent was defined under Article 2h of the Data Protection Directive as ‘any freely given specific and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to 
him being processed’ and Article 7 complemented the definition by stating that ‘the data subject has 
unambiguously given his consent’. 
144 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (as last 
revised and adopted on 10 April 2018) WP 259 rev.01 3 <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=623051> accessed 26 February 2020. 
145 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 3. 
146 see Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications 
and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications)’ (2019) 12293/19 
Article 4a(1). 
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3.2 FREELY GIVEN  
The first element of a valid consent is the data subject’s ability to exercise real choice regarding 
the processing of his or her personal data.150 Real choice means that ‘there is no risk of 
deception, intimidation, coercion or significant negative consequences if he/she does not 
consent’.151 Coercion can be in the form of social, financial or psychological, etc.152 If any of 
these factors are present then it should be interpreted that data subject has not been able to 
exercise freedom of choice.  
 
Recital 42 of the GDPR has also clarified that consent is not to be considered freely given if 
the data subject is ‘unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment’. This right is 
codified in Article 7(3) of the GDPR, which provides that it can be exercised ‘at any time’. 
Withdrawing consent ‘without detriment’ means that data subjects must be able to take back 
their consent without any disadvantage or other negative consequences.153 For example, 
controller cannot charge data subjects if they withdraw consent nor decrease the quality of its 
services.154 These provisions reaffirm that data subjects should be able to change their minds 
with respect to consent, thus retaining some level of control all the time.155 It has been said that 
‘the opportunity to change one’s mind is itself a valuable right’.156 Therefore, the right to 
revoke consent is also important to self-determination.  
 
Furthermore, the condition of ‘free will’ means that consent cannot be considered as freely 
given in circumstances where there is an imbalance of power between the data subject and the 
controller, such as, employer vis-à-vis employee or public authority versus the data subject.157 
The WP29 has taken the view that whenever the controller has influence over the data subject, 
then it should be inferred that data subject is not able to exercise real choice.158 Additionally, 
Article 7(4) and Recital 43 of the GDPR require that consent should not be part of the general 
 
150 ibid 12. 
151 ibid. 
152 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on the Processing of Personal Data Relating 
to Health in Electronic Health Records (EHR)’ (adopted on 15 February 2007) WP 131 8 
<https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp131_en.pdf> 
accessed 20 February 2020. 
153 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 10–
11. 
154 ibid 21. 
155 ibid 5. 
156 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 2003) 756. 
157 GDPR Recital 43; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 
2016/679’ (n 144) 5–7. 
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terms and conditions of a service, but must be separate and the data subject must have a real 
choice in accepting or declining the processing of data that is not necessary for the provision 
of the service in question. Hence, the delivery of services cannot be conditional upon consent, 
where such processing of personal data is not necessary for carrying out the contract, otherwise 
the legislator will presume that consent was not given freely. Processing of personal data, 
which is necessary for the performance of a contract is a distinct legal basis from consent and 
these two legal bases ‘cannot be merged and blurred’.159  
 
With respect to the use of cookies the WP29 is of the opinion that real choice means that the 
‘user should have an opportunity to freely choose between the option to accept some or all 
cookies or to decline all or some cookies and to retain the possibility to change the cookie 
settings in the future’.160 This coincides also with the requirements of specific consent, as 
cookies can be used for multiple purposes, from security purposes and language preferences to 
more invasive operations, such as, profiling and behavioural advertisement. Thus, cookie 
consent mechanisms should be designed in a way that offers granularity.  
 
In conclusion, in order to fulfil the first condition of consent data subject must be able to 
exercise free will without any conditionality or ‘inappropriate pressure or influence’ or suffer 
any ‘significant negative consequences’ if consent is not given or it is later withdrawn.161 
Additionally, the data subject should be on an equal footing with the party requesting consent. 
 
3.3 SPECIFIC 
The second element of consent is that consent must be ‘specific’. This element has also been 
elaborated in Article 6(1)(a) of the GDPR, which provides that consent must be given for ‘one 
or more specific purposes’. Thus, the GDPR prohibits bundling of purposes together without 
any option to choose when asking consent from data subjects. Instead the data subject should 
be able to decide which purposes he or she accepts and which he or she declines.162 Thus, 
Recital 32 states that if the processing contains multiple purposes, then ‘consent should be 
 
159 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 8. 
160 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 5. 
161 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 5–7, 
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given for all of them’.163 However, it also states that once consent is provided for a purpose or 
purposes then it shall ‘cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or 
purposes’. Thus, if the controller processes personal data for multiple purposes and consent is 
the appropriate basis, then there must be granularity, in other words, ‘the separation of these 
purposes and obtaining consent for each purpose’.164 For example, consent can cover the 
receipt of news on new products and their marketing, but it would not cover the transfer of 
personal data to third parties, as this would not be reasonably expected by the data subject.165 
Hence, this would require a distinct consent from the data subject, since the processing 
activities contain different purposes.166 Furthermore, if the processing purposes for which 
consent was initially sought change over time, then the data subject must be informed of these 
changes and have a real choice of deciding whether to accept these new purposes, in order for 
the consent to continue to be specific.167 
 
The principles of processing under Article 5 of the GDPR must also be taken into account when 
relying on consent as the legal basis. Consent does not provide freedom for controllers to ignore 
these data protection principles.168 The principle of purpose limitation under Article 5(1)(b) of 
the GDPR provides that personal data must be processed for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes’. Identifying the purposes for which processing of personal data is needed acts as a 
‘safeguard against function creep’.169 This phenomenon occurs when the processing purposes 
are blurred or gradually extended beyond what the data subject has initially consented to.170 
The consequences of function creep is that personal data may be used for purposes which are 
not reasonably expected by the data subject and additionally the data subject may end up losing 
control of his or her personal data.171 Thus, this phenomenon contains an inherent risk to data 
subjects.172 The legislators have sought to prevent this phenomenon of function creep by 
creating a buffer consisting of the requirements of specific consent and adherence to the 
principle of purpose limitation.173  
 
163 see also GDPR Recital 43 which states that controllers must ‘allow separate consent to be given to different 
personal data processing operations’. 
164 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 10. 
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The CJEU addressed the meaning of ‘specific’ consent in the case of Planet49 and stated that 
‘it must relate specifically to the processing of the data in question and cannot be inferred from 
an indication of the data subject’s wishes for other purposes’.174 For example, in the case at 
hand, the court was of the opinion that it cannot be inferred that a user has given his or her 
consent to the use of cookies from the fact that he or she decides to participate in the lottery 
offered by the company Planet49 and thus clicks on the participation button.175 The Advocate 
General (hereafter the ‘AG’) had similar reasonings and argued that the prerequisite for a freely 
given and informed consent is not only active behaviour, but that consent must also be separate 
from other action.176 Hence, accordingly the AG contended that:  
 
The activity a user pursues on the internet (reading a webpage, participating in a lottery, 
watching a video, etc.) and the giving of consent cannot form part of the same act. In 
particular, from the perspective of the user, the giving of consent cannot appear to be 
of an ancillary nature to the participation in the lottery.177 
 
The AG argued that clicking on the participation button once cannot cover ‘[t]wo expressions 
of intention… at the same time’.178 Hence, according to the CJEU and the AG consent cannot 
be muddled with an act that expresses at the same time another intention or purpose.  
 
In conclusion, the second element of consent, which is specific, requires that if the processing 
activities contain multiple purposes, then controller should seek consent for each separate 
purpose, rather than bundling them up. In other words, the element of granularity is important 
and must be present with respect to distinct purposes.179 Furthermore, the act of consenting 
must be separate from other action, such as continuing on the website.  
 
 
174 Case C‑673/17 Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale 
Bundesverband eV v Planet49 GmbH [2019] OJ C 413, para 58. 
175 ibid para 59. 
176 Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 66. 
177 ibid. 
178 ibid para 89. 
179 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent’ (n 38) 17, 19; 
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3.4 INFORMED 
The third element of valid consent is that consent must be ‘informed’. The requirements that 
consent must be both specific and informed are related.180 As a result, in order to fulfil the 
condition of ‘specific consent’, data subject must be informed about the intended purposes for 
which their personal data is being used.181 Consequently, data subject’s decision to accept the 
processing of his or her personal data must be based on appropriate information.182 According 
to the WP29 ‘blanket consent without specifying the exact purpose of the processing is not 
acceptable’.183 Additionally, consent can only apply to a set of processing activities, which 
have been clearly identified to the data subject and which the data subject can reasonably expect 
to be used in the processing context.184 This condition requires also that the information about 
the processing of personal data must be clearly distinct from other information, such as, 
marketing material or the terms and conditions of the service.185  
 
The WP29 has stated that this condition ‘aims to ensure a degree of user control and 
transparency for the data subject’.186 Though, the provision of information in itself will not 
automatically result in the data subject’s consent, since another legal ground may be more 
appropriate or the data subject might simply reject, nevertheless, ‘there must always be 
information before there can be consent’.187 Thus, it is important that data subjects are provided 
with relevant information before their consent is obtained, so that they can make an informed 
decision.188 Consequently, the requirements of prior information and informed consent are 
‘cumulative in nature’.189 The information must also be easily accessible in order for data 
subjects to have real control over the processing of their personal data under consent.190  
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The WP29 has instructed that cookie notices should be visible and communicated to the user 
prior to accepting the cookie settings.191 It could, for example, be presented on the entry page 
or be behind a link, but the link must be displayed prominently on the webpage.192 Furthermore, 
until the user has given his or her consent to the use of cookies, the website should keep 
displaying the relevant information.193 With respect to cookies placed by an ad network agency 
that can sponsor many different website companies, the WP29 has recognised that asking for 
user’s consent every time he or she visits a website partner of that ad network agency may be 
impractical.194 The WP29 has therefore stated that ‘the consent obtained to place the cookie 
and use the information to send targeting advertising would cover subsequent “readings” of the 
cookie that take place every time the user visits a website partner of the ad network provider 
which initially placed the cookie’.195 Nevertheless, the WP29 recommends that the validity of 
such consent should be limited, for example to one year, so that consent is not given in 
perpetuity.196 The ad network provider would then have to ask for new consent after the validity 
of the previous consent has elapsed.197   
 
In conclusion, the requirement that consent must be informed means essentially that the data 
subject must be given prior and appropriate information about the processing purposes. In other 
words, companies are required to be transparent about their data processing operations. 
Nevertheless, though informed consent and the obligation to provide information are linked to 
each other they are still distinct obligations under the GDPR.198 Controller’s obligation to 
provide information to data subjects will be explored further below in subchapter 3.9.   
 
3.5 UNAMBIGUOUS INDICATION  
The fourth element of valid consent is ‘unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes’, 
which must ‘signify’ data subject’s agreement to the processing operations.199 The provision 
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clarifies also that the indication must be ‘by a statement or by a clear affirmative action’.200 
Hence, making it clear that silence, or inaction,201 or merely continuing with a service is not 
sufficient to constitute consent.202 This is because silence and inaction have ‘inherent 
ambiguity’ in them and it is difficult to demonstrate that consent has been given through 
inaction or silence.203 The WP29 has interpreted ‘unambiguous’ to mean that there must be ‘no 
doubt as to the data subject's intention to deliver consent’.204 
 
GDPR prohibits also the use of pre-ticked opt-in boxes in Recital 32. Thus, valid consent under 
the Regulation ‘must always be given through an active motion or declaration’.205 This 
prohibition has also been confirmed by the CJEU in the Planet49 case.206 In its judgment the 
CJEU held that the wording ‘given his or her consent’ to the use of cookies requires action 
from the user when consenting.207 This interpretation is also supported by the fact that both the 
Data Protection Directive and the GDPR require an ‘indication’ of the data subject’s wishes in 
their definition of consent, which according to the court ‘clearly points to active, rather than 
passive, behaviour’.208 Furthermore, consent must also be ‘unambiguous’, which can only be 
fulfilled by active behaviour.209 Thus, the court noted that a pre-ticked checkbox did not satisfy 
the notion of active behaviour by the user required under a valid consent.210  
 
The court reasoned that the issues with a pre-ticked checkbox is that a) it could be possible that 
the website user has not read the notice regarding the checkbox, or b) not even noticed the 
checkbox, before submitting the form.211 Hence, according to the court it is difficult to 
determine objectively whether the user has made an informed and positive decision to consent 
to the processing of his or her personal data by not removing the pre-ticked checkbox.212 The 
court took also into account the fact that the legislators had in 2009 substantially modified 
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Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, by incorporating an explicit requirement to obtain 
consent before any cookies could be used or placed on a user’s device.213 Due to this 
amendment the court made the inference that ‘henceforth user consent may no longer be 
presumed but must be the result of active behaviour on the part of the user’.214   
 
Recital 66 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive states that consent can be acquired through ‘using 
the appropriate settings of a browser or other application’, provided that the existing technology 
can generate consent mechanisms that will meet the criteria of valid consent.215 This statement 
has garnered confusion in Member States over how to obtain cookie consent and has resulted 
in debates whether or not it is possible to imply consent from the default browser settings.216 
As the report from ENISA shows ‘[s]ome states have suggested existing browser settings 
would remain adequate, through the legal fiction that they convey “implicit consent”. The 
majority view … is to require explicit, affirmative consent for each website’.217  
 
The WP29 has made it clear that having browser settings in a mode where they accept the use 
of cookies by default, would not constitute a valid consent under Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive.218 It stated that the recital ‘is not an exception to Article 5(3) but rather a reminder 
that, in this technological environment, consent can be given in different ways - where 
technically possible, effective and in accordance with the other relevant requirements for valid 
consent’.219 Therefore, if browser settings have by default privacy protection on then it can be 
an effective tool in obtaining cookie consent.220 It emphasised that active behaviour by the 
individual is the key to obtaining valid consent to cookies, hence consent can be obtained 
through browser settings provided that the website user has been ‘fully informed and actively 
configured their browser’.221 It goes without saying that nowadays, taking into consideration 
the spirit of the EU’s data protection framework, which aspires to provide strong privacy 
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protection for natural persons222 and the privacy by design and by default principles introduced 
by the GDPR in Article 25, the browser settings of cookies should by default have the highest 
privacy settings on automatically.  
 
The WP29 has also emphasised that it must be demonstrated that the positive action was taken 
as a result of user being well informed of the meaning of such action.223 Hence, the appropriate 
information on the setting and use of cookies must be in close proximity to the button, link or 
box, through which the user indicates his or her consent to the cookies.224 It must be clear to 
the user that the information and the active behaviour constitute the same package and the user 
must not confuse the information with other material, such as, advertisement.225  
 
In conclusion, in order for consent to be ‘unambiguous’ there must be active behaviour on the 
part of the user. Pre-ticked boxes and other methods providing implicit consent, such as, default 
browser settings allowing cookies automatically, are no longer accepted under the GDPR.  
 
3.6 OTHER ELEMENTS OF CONSENT  
3.6.1 Timing   
Processing of personal data cannot be commenced before data subject has provided his or her 
consent.226 Thus, the timing of consent is crucial in order to make processing lawful.227 As with 
its predecessor, the GDPR does not explicitly mention when exactly consent must be obtained. 
It can, however, be deduced from the language used in the legislation that the general rule is 
that consent must be obtained prior to commencing the processing in question.228 For example 
Article 6(1)(a) of the GDPR states that processing is lawful only when the data subject ‘has 
given consent’. This is further supported by the fact that if personal data is processed before 
consent is obtained, then the processing itself does not have any legal ground and is thus 
unlawful.229  
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3.6.2 Evidence of consent 
The WP29 recommended under the old legislation that controllers should be able to show 
evidence of given consent, so that consent can be verified in case any dispute arises, or consent 
is questioned by, inter alia, data subjects or regulatory authorities.230 The GDPR incorporated 
this good practice into its framework and provides expressly in Article 7(1) that controllers 
shall be able to demonstrate that valid consent has been obtained. This is also confirmed in 
Recital 42, which stresses the importance of documenting consent.  
 
3.7 EXPLICIT CONSENT  
Companies and organisations processing special categories of personal data, such as, health 
data, political opinions and ethnic origin, which are considered sensitive, must obtain data 
subject’s ‘explicit consent’ under Article 9(2)(a) of the GDPR. Thus, in these cases Article 
6(1)(a) type of ‘regular consent’ is not sufficient. The difference between explicit consent and 
regular consent is, however, very fine. For example, the WP29 has recognised that a signed 
agreement or written statement of consent would demonstrate unambiguous consent.231 
Additionally, ticking a box is a commonly recognised way to show ‘express, unambiguous 
consent’ in both online232 and offline environment. Both of these examples seem to, however, 
overlap with the concept of explicit consent. This is supported by the fact that the WP29 has 
asserted that explicit consent can be obtained through written statement and if needed including 
a signature.233 Furthermore, it has stated that these methods would constitute express 
consent,234 and that ‘explicit consent’ and ‘express consent’ as legal terms have the same 
meaning in law.235 Yet, they are also using these methods as examples to show what constitutes 
unambiguous indication for the regular consent.  
 
The WP29 has explained that explicit consent ‘encompasses all situations where individuals 
are presented with a proposal to agree or disagree to a particular use or disclosure of their 
personal information and they respond actively to the question, orally or in writing’.236 This 
seems to be very similar to regular consent, especially under the GDPR, since it also requires 
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active behaviour by the data subject. The WP29 has further explained that the difference with 
explicit consent from the regular one is ‘the way consent is expressed by the data subject’.237 
In other words, there must be an ‘express statement of consent’ by the data subject.238 
Nevertheless, they have used the term ‘express statement’ and ‘express consent’ in their earlier 
guidance when discussing unambiguous indication with respect to the regular consent under 
the Data Protection Directive.239 This has not been addressed in their later guidance on consent 
under the GDPR, hence the WP29’s interpretations are ambiguous.  
 
Explicit consent cannot be inferred from data subject’s actions, hence opt-out options would 
not suffice in meeting the conditions of explicit consent.240 Thus, it is clear that explicit consent 
requires a positive action by the data subject, such as, completing an electronic form, sending 
an email,241 or clicking on a button or an icon.242 However, these seem like actions that would 
also be required when obtaining regular consent under the GDPR, since the WP29 has stated 
that ‘data subject must have taken a deliberate action to consent to the particular processing’, 
such as, writing a letter or typing an email.243 A further step from this is to use two-stage 
verification in order to demonstrate explicit consent.244  
 
Apart from the two-stage verification method, regular consent and explicit consent do not seem 
to differ that much from each other. This is especially the case since it is questionable whether 
even regular consent can be inferred from user’s behaviour anymore under the GDPR, since it 
has provided a higher threshold than its predecessor245 by requiring a clear and positive action. 
This is supported by the fact that the WP29 has stated with respect to the condition of 
unambiguous indication that it has to be ‘obvious that the data subject has consented to the 
particular processing’.246 This thesis argues that if regular consent must be ‘obvious’ under the 
GDPR, then it cannot really be inferred from any action. Hence, these two forms of consent 
are easily blurred, and it is doubtful whether explicit consent will in fact provide any better 
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protection to sensitive personal data than regular consent, since the demonstrated methods for 
obtaining either consent are very similar. It is also debatable whether a consent can in fact be 
only unambiguous without being inherently also explicit. If this is not the case, then the 
difference between a regular and an explicit consent becomes illusory. It would be clearer if 
explicit consent would be defined as always needing for example two-stage verification, such 
as ticking a box and signing the form, whether electronically or manually.  
 
3.8 TRANSPARENCY  
The data protection regime in the EU and the guidelines adopted by the WP29 constantly 
emphasise on the data subject’s right to be informed of the processing as discussed above. This 
is part of the transparency principle under the GDPR.247 Though transparency has been a ‘long 
established feature of the law of the EU’,248 it is a new explicit requirement in the data 
protection framework as a result of the GDPR249 and is ‘intrinsically linked to fairness and the 
new principle of accountability under the GDPR’.250 In order for processing to be fair it must 
be transparent.251 The accountability principle under the GDPR Article 5(2) obligates 
controllers to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR and hence processing operations must 
be transparent.252 The GDPR holds no definition of transparency, but Recital 39 elaborates that 
it ‘should be transparent to natural persons that personal data concerning them are collected, 
used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent the personal data are or will be 
processed’. Additionally, the same recital provides that data subjects ‘should be made aware 
of risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal data and how to 
exercise their rights in relation to such processing’. 
 
Transparency is also an important feature with respect to consent as mentioned above. The 
precondition for obtaining an informed and specific consent is that data subject must be aware 
of what he or she is consenting to. Hence, for consent to be valid it must be based on prior 
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information. Transparency in itself does not make processing of personal data lawful, but it is 
‘a condition of being in control and for rendering the consent valid’.253  
 
3.9 INFORMATION OBLIGATION  
The European Commission has noted that since privacy policies are not always transparent 
enough, especially in the online environment, this raises the risk that website users are not 
sufficiently aware of their rights and therefore are unable to provide a valid consent.254 The 
legislators have tried to tackle this by enhancing the transparency principle under the GDPR 
and improving the list of details in Articles 13 and 14 that companies must provide to data 
subjects when processing their personal data. Article 13 addresses situations when personal 
data is collected directly from the data subject, whilst Article 14 covers situations where 
personal data is collected from another source. Nevertheless, the information to be provided in 
either situation is similar, and they include, inter alia, controller’s contact details, purposes of 
processing, legal basis, the recipients of personal data, whether data is transferred outside the 
EEA, the storage period and data subject’s rights.  
 
The GDPR has also emphasised in Article 12 that the information must be ‘concise, 
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language’. Thus, the 
Regulation seems to set a quite high threshold for the information obligation. Firstly, the 
information must be comprehensive in order to be transparent and informative to the data 
subjects, so that they are not ‘taken by surprise at a later point about the ways in which their 
personal data has been used’.255 In addition, the text must be written ‘efficiently and succinctly 
in order to avoid information fatigue’.256  
 
Secondly, the privacy or cookie notice must be written in intelligible, clear and understandable 
language, without any legal, technical or any other specialist jargon.257 Furthermore, the text 
must be ‘concrete and definitive; it should not be phrased in abstract or ambivalent terms or 
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leave room for different interpretations’.258 In terms of consent, it can only be informed if the 
data subject understands the consequences for consenting and withholding consent.259 A rule 
of thumb for writing a privacy or cookie notice is that a ‘regular/average user should be able 
to understand it’.260  
 
Thirdly, it must be clear to the data subject where he or she can find the information.261 Thus, 
it is ‘not enough for information to be “available” somewhere’.262 Even the CJEU addressed 
this in 2004 in joined cases, where it held that consent was not validly given when an 
employment contract merely referred to another contract that contained the conditions to which 
consent was given.263 The WP29 has emphasised that the ‘information must be clearly 
visible’264 and distinct from any other information, such as, the general terms of use.265 
Information can be provided by different means, though Article 12(1) explicitly mentions ‘in 
writing’, hence making it the default position.266 Other methods explicitly recognised by the 
provision include electronically and orally.  
 
The first two requirements provide a difficult hurdle for controllers to overcome, since in 
order for the privacy or cookie notice to meet the standard envisioned by the GDPR, it must 
be both sufficiently detailed in order to be comprehensive but also clear and understandable. 
This can be difficult, especially with respect to cookies, since explaining the cookie 
technology in a clear and intelligible manner can be difficult. The WP29 has recognised this 
conflict in the GDPR and stated that:  
 
There is an inherent tension in the GDPR between the requirements on the one hand to 
provide the comprehensive information to data subjects which is required under the 
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GDPR, and on the other hand do so in a form that is concise, transparent, intelligible 
and easily accessible.267   
 
The WP29 recommends websites to use layered privacy notices ‘in order to avoid information 
fatigue’, as this method ‘can help resolve the tension between completeness and understanding, 
notably by allowing users to navigate directly to the section of the statement/ notice that they 
wish to read’.268 Nevertheless, the WP29 also recognises that the whole information notice 
must be available to data subjects ‘in one single place’ or as ‘one complete document’ in case 
a data subject wants to check the privacy notice in its entirety.269  
 
3.10 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has outlined the components of consent and the principle of transparency under 
the GDPR. As has been discussed above, in order for consent to be valid it must be freely given, 
informed, specific and unambiguous. This thesis argues that consent is in itself a difficult 
threshold to overcome, since it constitutes so many elements. Each component must be present 
before consent is considered valid under the GDPR. Consent can arguably be an effective tool 
in providing control to data subjects if correctly used, because it enables data subjects to 
exercise the right to self-determination. In contrast, if consent does not meet its requirements 
of valid consent imposed by the data protection law, then data subjects will not have effective 
control over their personal data. Additionally, companies will face serious compliance risks if 
they process personal data under an invalid consent as they will not have a valid legal basis for 
their processing activity which has relied on consent.  
 
It can also be argued that consent is not an effective tool in the online environment in providing 
control to users, because there will always be some level of imbalance of power between the 
website operators and internet users, due to the substantial use of the internet in the modern 
world and its importance in people’s lives. Additionally, it could be argued that there is also, 
to a certain extent, social pressure or influence, especially with respect to social media sites. 
For example, as many people use Instagram, Facebook, Zoom and LinkedIn, an individual can 
feel secluded from his or her friends and peers if he or she does not join these communities as 
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well irrespective of the privacy risks.270 Thus, it can be argued that consent is not the 
appropriate legal basis for processing personal data through cookies, since it lacks the element 
of free will. 
 
Furthermore, the information obligation contains some conflicting features as the GDPR 
requires the information to be both clear and easily understandable but also comprehensive. 
Arguably, one way to deal with this tension is to use layered information as recommended by 
the WP29. The question is whether individuals will actually read the information provided to 
them before consenting. This issue is further explored in the next chapter. Nevertheless, this is 
a difficult hurdle, as evidenced by the Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis report. The WP29 
inspected in this report the cookie notifications of 404 websites in more detail and drew the 
conclusion that 43% did not provide sufficient information to enable the user to make an 
informed decision regarding the use of cookies.271 It did not, however, go into detail as to what 
was lacking in these cookie notices. Since, the information obligation requirements are 
conflicting it is questionable whether companies will be able to meet the GDPR standard. 
Failure to provide sufficiently detailed, yet, clear and understandable information means that 
data subjects will not be able to make an informed decision regarding the use and disclosure of 
their personal data. Hence, consent and notice are not an effective tool in providing control and 
protection to individuals in the context of personal data processed through internet cookies. 
 
This thesis has also criticised the WP29’s ambiguous guidance concerning ‘regular consent’ 
and ‘explicit consent’. The lack of clear explanation between the differences of these two forms 
of consent can result in controllers using the explicit consent form as a ‘just in case’ method. 
Alternatively, they might not meet the threshold of regular consent, if they cannot see the 
difference between regular and explicit consent requirements. Hence, better clarification is in 
order when distinguishing these two consent forms so that they can be used accurately.   
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 Effectiveness of Cookie Consents and Notices 
4.1 PROBLEMS WITH COOKIE CONSENT 
As has been recognised above, consent is an established legal basis making data processing 
lawful. There is, however, criticism on consent and whether it is the appropriate tool in privacy 
and data protection in the online environment. It has, for example, been criticised that the 
European lawmakers have been unwise in ‘introducing consent as a legal ground in the sphere 
of human rights’.272 This criticism can be applied to privacy and data protection, since these 
are fundamental human rights in the EU, as established in the introductory chapter of this thesis.  
 
In the modern times personal data is quite essential to most online services in order for them 
to function.273 As a result, internet users may find themselves exhausted by having to reply to 
a number of consent requests left and right on a daily basis.274 This ‘click fatigue’ can in turn 
result in blindly accepting cookies as users will not be bothered to read the cookie information, 
in which case there is no longer an effective and valid consent.275 This subchapter explores the 
criticism by academics and discusses whether consent is an effective tool for lawmakers to 
cling onto in the context of cookies. It should be noted that some of the discussion will overlap 
with the debate on the effectiveness of cookie notices, which will be further explored in 
subchapter 4.2. This is because, as has been mentioned previously, the obligation to provide 
information is also essential in the context of consent, since valid consent means that the user 
has been informed.  
4.1.1 Economic Theory and Behavioural Economics 
Professor Borgesius has recognised that today’s lawmakers in privacy and data protection give 
much importance to consent.276 He has, however, claimed that ‘behavioral studies cast doubt 
on this approach’s effectiveness, as people tend to agree with almost any request they see on 
their screens’.277 Borgesius discusses the issues with consent in practice with respect to 
behavioural targeting using economic theory and behavioural economics. Behavioural 
 
272 Paul de Hert, ‘Reply: The Use of Labour Law to Regulate Employer Profiling: Making Data Protection 
Relevant Again’ to Nils Leopold and Martin Meints, ‘Profiling in Employment Situations (Fraud)’ in Mireille 
Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives 
(Springer Netherlands 2008) 232. 
273 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 17. 
274 ibid. 
275 ibid.  
276 Borgesius (n 40) 103. 
277 ibid. 
Alexandra From 014468861 
 55 
economics utilizes psychology and behavioural studies when analysing people’s decision 
making process in economics.278 His analysis can also be applied to cookie usage in general, 
since behavioural advertising is generally carried out through cookies.279 In Borgesius’ 
opinion, accepting cookies is similar to ‘entering a market transaction with a company’.280 In 
this transaction the effect of consent is, however, reduced by ‘information asymmetries’ and 
‘transaction costs’.281  
 
Information asymmetries arise due to lack of users’ knowledge about how companies use their 
data, which results in a deficient informed consent.282 Other scholars have also recognised 
information asymmetry as a reason for the failure of consent.283 Information asymmetry seems 
to continue to be a problem even after the GDPR, which aimed to tackle this issue through the 
requirement of transparency, so that companies are obligated to inform users about their data 
processing operations. The Special Eurobarometer on the GDPR, conducted in March 2019, 
shows that only 22% of the respondents using the internet replied that they feel like they are 
always informed about the data processing operations.284 The survey also shows that in most 
countries there has been more decrease in awareness than increase compared to 2015.285  
 
Borgesius argues that legislators have been unsuccessful in tackling information asymmetry 
due to the accompanying transaction costs.286 According to this theory, users rarely read 
privacy policies because they tend to be heavy, ambiguous and not reader friendly, hence it 
would be too time consuming for users to actually familiarise themselves with these policies.287 
This argument is supported by a research conducted by McDonald and Cranor in the US that 
discovered that if internet users would read the complete online privacy policies of all new 
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websites that they visit in a year, then this would take around 40 minutes per day and cost $781 
billion to the nation.288 It has been stated that ‘[i]t would be a full-time job to protect your 
privacy in a notice and consent mode’, especially since the average user’s limited time is 
already divided between work, family and hobbies.289 
 
Furthermore, according to Borgesius, people are also influenced by biases, such as, the status 
quo bias, which is ‘the tendency to stick with default options’, and the present bias, which is 
‘the tendency to choose immediate gratification and disregard future costs or disadvantages’.290 
Hence, according to the status quo bias companies are likely to obtain more consents in an opt-
out system, because people are not inclined to change the default option.291 The present bias, 
on the other hand, shows that if companies use cookie walls, meaning that access to the website 
is conditional upon accepting the use of cookies, then people are more willing to click on the 
accept button, without concerning them with its consequences, because they want to access the 
website and its services.292 Thus, as has been said by professor Solove ‘privacy is an issue of 
long-term information management, while most decisions to consent to the collection, use, or 
disclosure of data are tied to a short-term benefit’.293 This issue could be partly reduced by 
rules which prohibit cookie walls. However, as will be seen in subchapter 6.1 of this thesis, the 
debate regarding cookie walls is still ongoing under the proposed ePrivacy Regulation.  
 
Borgesius has rightly claimed that the effectiveness of consent in cookie usage is diminished 
if websites are allowed to use cookie walls, as this provides a ‘take it or leave it’ type of 
situation.294 This will inevitably impose some influence on the individual’s choice, which can 
be especially powerful if the user cannot attain same or similar services from another website. 
As discussed above, consent is not free if data subject is influenced in his or her choice. Hence, 
it is argued that there can never be valid consent when using cookie walls, as the user is 
essentially forced to accept the cookies if he or she wants to access the website services.   
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4.1.2 Cognitive and Structural Problems 
Solove has also recognised that privacy and data protection laws aim ‘to provide people with 
control over their personal data, and through this control people can decide for themselves how 
to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information’.295 He 
calls this approach ‘privacy self-management’, which ‘takes refuge in consent’.296 In his 
opinion, there are two issues with privacy self-management, which makes it unsuccessful in 
conferring to individuals ‘meaningful control over their data’ and these are i) cognitive 
problems and ii) structural problems.297   
 
Cognitive problems explain why people are unable to make informed and rational choices 
when it comes to weighing the costs and benefits of allowing the use of their personal data.298 
The first related problem to the cognitive concern is the issue of informing individuals about 
the use made of their data so as to enable them to choose whether or not to consent.299 Solove, 
however, argues that there is an inherent problem with notices, because ‘making it simple and 
easy to understand conflicts with fully informing people about the consequences of giving up 
data, which are quite complex if explained in sufficient detail to be meaningful’.300 Hence, it 
seems to be almost impossible to make a privacy notice clear, short and comprehensive all at 
the same time as required under the GDPR.301 It could arguably be overcome by the use of 
granular information, though Solove has argued that ‘additional granularity adds complexity 
and create risks of confusion’.302  
 
The second related problem under the cognitive issue is that people’s decision making is 
skewed and that they do not have the ‘expertise to adequately assess the consequences of 
agreeing to certain present uses or disclosures of their data’, even if they would constantly read 
privacy policies.303 This is due to people’s ‘bounded rationality’ in which individuals ‘struggle 
to apply their knowledge to complex situations’,304 and instead they ‘often rely on rules of 
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thumb or heuristics’.305 Another factor affecting individual’s decision-making is ‘availability 
heuristics’, which means that in people’s minds, dangers which they have not encountered 
before are not seen as risky as dangers which they are familiar with.306 Solove argues that the 
reason why individual’s decision making is skewed and easily affected by these and other 
factors is because ‘privacy is so complex, contextual, and difficult to conceptualize’.307  
 
This thesis agrees with Solove’s above statement that, since privacy and data protection are 
quite abstract, it might be difficult for data subjects to understand the risks entailing in 
recklessly disclosing their personal data, especially in the online environment. Furthermore, 
the fact that users cannot check from one place all the data that is available about them on the 
internet makes this an invisible threat. If individuals could check their ‘data account’ to see the 
total amounts of data and the type of personal data that is available to companies and 
governments, they might become more cautious in exchanging their personal data for ‘free 
services’ online. Data subjects do have the right to access their data and get a copy of it under 
Article 15 of the GDPR. However, since people’s personal data is processed by many different 
website operators, data subjects would have to request access from all of them, in order to get 
a comprehensive picture of all their personal data moving around in the internet. Thus, there is 
no one data account for a user’s personal data. The allure of ‘free services’ and the 
inclusiveness offered by the internet community is very powerful, which is why people are 
willing to give away their personal data relatively easily without thinking too much about it.  
 
Moving on to structural problems, Solove claims that even if people are ‘fully informed and 
rational’ they will still be burdened by structural problems, which ‘involve impediments to 
one’s ability to adequately asses the costs and benefits of consenting to various forms of 
collection, use and disclosure of personal data’.308 In terms of structural problems, Solove 
recognises first the ‘problem of scale’.309 This refers to the problem that it is impossible for 
individuals to control and monitor all entities processing their personal data, due to the large 
scale, regardless if all companies constructed intelligible privacy management tools for 
them.310 This is because people lack time and resources.311 Consenting to cookies on every 
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single website that a user visits during a day can be exhaustive as a data subject can visit dozens 
of websites in a day.312 Furthermore, as Solove contends, companies tend to update their 
privacy policies, which means that data subjects would have to revisit them,313 and make a new 
informed decision about whether or not to let the company process their personal data. It could, 
however, be counterargued that companies probably do not update their privacy policies that 
frequently (maybe once a year), unless their processing operations undergo some significant 
changes. Nevertheless, this can still become burdensome for the user considering all the 
privacy policies he or she would have to revisit if all the websites he or she has visited in a year 
annually update their privacy policies.  
 
The second issue under structural problems raised by Solove is the ‘aggregation effect’, 
whereby different portions of data, which have been given in isolation, are combined and may 
thus reveal new information about the person in question.314 It may be difficult for data subjects 
to understand and asses the risks and benefits of aggregated data at the time of data collection, 
when consent is usually asked, as the consequences of aggregated data, whether beneficial or 
harmful, tend to reveal itself at a later time.315  
 
The issue with aggregation effect is also applicable to cookies, especially third party cookies 
placed by ad network agencies. This is because data subjects may give consent to various 
websites to use third party advertising cookies, without realising that some or many websites 
might use the same ad network agency. This means that the same ad network will track the 
user’s behaviour on the different websites that it has partnered with and collect vast amount of 
information, which it can combine in order to create a detailed profile of the user.316 A data 
subject may consider that consenting to cookies on individual webpages is very innocent as he 
or she drops individual pieces of data in different contexts. Nevertheless, combined these 
innocuous data can together reveal sensitive data. This is supported by Dr. Betkier, who has 
stated that ‘[p]eople may be unable to make a rational trade-off between the privacy risk and 
economic benefit, even if they have a choice and have read and understood the privacy policy. 
One reason for this is the problem of the complexity of choice due to data aggregation’.317 
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Hence, he argues that consent ‘may not be the appropriate authorisation method for the online 
environment’.318 
 
Thirdly, Solove recognises the ‘problem of assessing harm’ as part of structural problems and 
stated that ‘Harm from privacy violations can develop gradually over time, but decisions about 
privacy must be made individually, in isolation, and far in advance.’319 Furthermore, 
individuals tend to ‘favor immediate benefits even when there may be future detriments’.320 
4.1.3 Criticism of Opt-in Consent Systems 
The opt-in consent system has been criticised as it may be ‘unnecessarily costly and impede 
socially beneficial uses’.321 This opt-in and prior notice system has also generated criticism 
from Clifford, who has stated that: ‘The more common cookie notices become, the more 
mundane, easily dismissed and ineffective the obligation to consent is rendered.’322 In his 
opinion, EU lawmakers should focus more on privacy by design rather than the controversial 
concept of consent, as data subjects are best protected when applications and software are 
inherently built with privacy protective features.323 He has stated that ‘the future of protection 
lies with laws regulating manufacturing standards and the concept of privacy by design’.324 
This is also supported by Hildebrandt and Tielemans, who have stated that: ‘This would 
incentivize technological innovation with regard to built-in data protection, because once such 
technology is state of the art it becomes the legal standard.’325 The GDPR has incorporated 
privacy by design requirement, but it remains to be seen how effective this will be. Mitchell 
has also expressed his doubts about whether an opt-in consent model will do anything to protect 
users better than an opt-out system. He has rightly claimed that:  
 
While this approach certainly solves the dilemma of reasonable data privacy 
expectations, it does not address what I believe is the fundamental problem associated 
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with modern internet use: in order to use the internet for any purpose, individuals must 
sacrifice their right to data privacy in some measure. Such conditional use always puts 
the user at a substantial disadvantage. The bargaining leverage websites enjoy in this 
regard borders on coercion, especially when considering the modern need of internet 
use and the substantial sacrifice associated with private data access.326 
 
Carolan has also noted that ‘there is little, if any, qualitative difference between default settings 
of which the user is unaware and the default settings to which a user is invited to “click” their 
unthinking approval’.327 Jones and Tahir have argued that another issue with an opt-in consent, 
as a tool for enabling the use of cookies, is the question of how website operators are going to 
‘identify and keep track of users who have consented to the use of cookies’.328 This thesis 
argues that keeping track of users who have consented should be easier, than keeping track of 
those who have refused cookies, since website operators need to store and document the 
consent, as required under the GDPR Article 7(1). But, if user refuses the storage of cookies 
on his or her device, including the cookie containing an ID number, then website operators will 
not have any means of identifying (except maybe with an IP address329) when the same user 
returns or when the same user visits different websites backed up by the same advertisement 
network. This means that the user who has refused cookies would have to do so every time he 
or she visits the website, which could also result in click fatigue.  
 
Despite all the criticism, there are scholars who have also acknowledged the value of an opt-in 
model. Monteleone, for example, recognises the importance of an opt-in system due to the 
status quo bias, hence she states that ‘this highlights the relevance of default privacy settings 
for the privacy online’.330 Tene and Polonetsky have also acknowledged the value of having 
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distinct opt-in and opt-out models.331 They argue that those activities, which are socially 
acceptable should benefit from ‘implicit’ rather than ‘explicit’ consent.332 In their view: 
 
Some activities are value creating, socially desirable, and minimally intrusive; they 
should be permitted to exist as default options. Other activities are privacy intrusive, 
socially menacing, and may inflict real harm on users; they should be prohibited absent 
users’ informed, explicit, opt-in consent.333 
 
It is, however, questionable whether an opt-in system actually effectuates a better consent, 
since arguably data subjects might just automatically click on the accept button, without really 
thinking about it as they are impatient to get to the website. As Carolan has stated ‘that active 
step can itself become the effective default option’.334  
4.1.4 Other Criticism and Alternative Methods  
Mantelero has also criticised the traditional ‘notice and consent’ model in the modern age of 
Big Data.335 In his view, this traditional model does not work in situations of complex data 
processing operations, as data subjects do not have the capability to comprehend the data 
processing and its purposes in these cases and are thus unable to exercise self-determination 
and make informed decisions.336 Hence, he argues that in these types of complex situations ‘the 
decision about data processing cannot be left to users, but at the same time user’s rights to 
oppose to data processing and not to have personal data collected … should be preserved’.337 
In these cases, he suggests that policymakers should adopt a new paradigm constituting of data 
protection impact assessments, which are ‘based on the model of risk analysis and evaluate ex 
ante the future impact that a specific services or product could have on privacy or data 
protection’.338 The assessment should be carried out by qualified third parties and subject to 
the supervision by data protection authorities.339  
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In his opinion, data protection authorities have better knowledge of the technological 
complexities raised by data processing and are in a better position to ‘evaluate the risks 
associated to data processing and can adopt legal remedies to tackle them’.340 The company 
should inform the data subjects of the results of the data protection impact assessment and 
provide them the opportunity to opt-out from the data processing.341 Thus, Mantelero 
recommends a model that combines both a data protection impact assessment and opt-out 
system.342 In his opinion: 
 
From the user’s point of view, on one hand the assessment conducted by the data 
protection authorities gives a guarantee of an effective evaluation of the risks related to 
data processing and, on the other hand, the opt-out allows users to receive information 
about data processing and to decide if they do not want to be part of the data 
collection.343  
 
The GDPR has introduced data protection assessment, which should be conducted in certain 
situations, such as, in automatic profiling.344 Thus, the legislators have recognised the 
importance of pre-emptive steps combined with an opt-in approach. This seems to provide a 
comprehensive protection to data subjects even in the online environment. However, under the 
GDPR data protection assessment is conducted by the company itself and it does not need to 
be public.345 Therefore, this assessment under the GDPR is not as transparent as it could be.  
 
Mantelero’s idea is in theory good, but in practice it can be quite difficult to implement, 
especially if data protection authorities have to take the initiative to supervise all data protection 
projects of all companies under their jurisdiction. This would be very cumbersome to put into 
effect in practice and overload the data protection authorities even more, who are already 
understaffed since the GDPR came into force.346 Nevertheless, Article 36 of the GDPR has 
recognised that the controller must turn to a data protection authority for prior consultation in 
case the data protection impact assessment ‘indicates that the processing would result in a high 
risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller to mitigate the risk’. Hence, in certain 
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circumstances data protection authorities do have a more active role when it comes to 
supervising data protection impact assessments.  
 
Tene and Polonetsky have also recognised the ‘increasing complexity of the online information 
ecosystem’.347 They have argued that requiring users to decide whether or not to consent to 
divulge their data in this complex environment is ‘tantamount to imposing the burden of health 
care decisions on patients instead of doctors’.348 The authors have also argued that instead of 
shifting the burden to users, policymakers ‘should focus on the limits of online behavioral 
tracking practices by considering which activities are socially acceptable and spelling out 
default norms accordingly’.349 The authors argue that consent and transparency mechanisms 
‘are inherently skewed’ and therefore these mechanisms are applied inconsistently.350 Hence, 
they argue that instead of having notice and consent at the centre, ‘the focal point for privacy 
should shift from users to policymakers or self-regulatory leaders, to determine the contours of 
accepted practices, and businesses, to handle information fairly and responsibly’.351 This shift 
of privacy burden from users to companies ‘will have the effect of making online privacy a 
matter of corporate governance’.352 This is what the GDPR has attempted to do, as it places the 
burden on companies to process personal data fairly and transparently and for them to be held 
accountable if they fail to meet their obligations under the Regulation.  
 
Providing a valid consent in the online environment is further complicated by the fact that there 
is a limited choice of service providers that provide the same services, especially with respect 
to the popular ones, for example, Facebook and Google.353 Data portability is now possible 
under Article 20 of the GDPR, which makes switching service providers easier as data subjects 
have the right to have the old service provider transfer all their personal data to the new service 
provider. Nevertheless, it has been argued by Dr. Betkier that ‘a strong “network effect” exists 
caused by the overwhelming majority of users subscribed to the “main” service providers’,354 
which deters many from changing service providers. Thus, as users may be influenced by these 
factors when giving consent it is not really freely given.355   
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Despite all the criticism surrounding consent in the online environment, according to Markou 
‘privacy is so intrinsically connected with consent that the latter could never be abandoned as 
a principal tool of privacy protection’.356 He also argues that since the prior consent mechanism 
in the amended Article 5(3) of the Privacy Directive has ‘never consistently been implemented 
by (major) online businesses’, there is not sufficient evidence to state that consent does not 
work with respect to cookies.357 It has also been stated by Koulu that ‘consent has proven … 
to be exceptionally durable’.358 Tene and Polonetsky have also acknowledged the importance 
of consent in privacy law, though they criticise it for being an ‘elusive concept’, a ‘wild card’ 
and  ‘seldom truly voluntary’, since it is encumbered by power imbalance, such as, consumers 
against big corporations.359 Nevertheless, they agree that ‘consent cannot be entirely done away 
with, since conceptions of privacy typically incorporate control as a key component, or indeed 
describe privacy as a form of control over information’.360 Therefore, consent, which is ‘the 
manifestation of individual control – is inextricably tied to privacy’.361 Furthermore, they argue 
that the absence of consent in privacy law would make it ‘overly rigid and paternalistic’.362  
 
As the notion of consent is so entrenched in the EU’s data protection framework and especially 
with respect to cookies, it is unlikely that the EU legislators will abandon consent easily and in 
the near future as a tool for the lawful use of cookies. This can be seen from the proposed 
ePrivacy Regulation, as none of its previous drafts have even suggested an alternative legal 
basis for the use of cookies, but instead kept riding on the traditional consent practices as a 
habit. There is, however, a change of wind coming with the newest revised version by the 
Croatian Presidency adopted on 21 February 2020, who has taken the step to include legitimate 
interest as an alternative legal basis for cookies. This is further discussed below in subchapter 
6.2. 
  
It has been stated by Lindqvist that ‘some feel that data protection legislation stiffens 
innovation altogether’,363 although the author has not explained who these people are. It can, 
however, be assumed that this includes at least entrepreneurs and other people in the business 
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industry, who are more concerned with profits and economic growth, where innovation is a big 
part of the scenario. Nevertheless, instead of resulting in an impasse of innovation, data 
protection legislation should be seen as a challenge to think outside the box and invent 
technologies with strong built-in privacy protection. This in turn would result in privacy 
protective technologies to become state of the art as highlighted above by Hildebrandt and 
Tielemans.364 Thus, as suggested by Hildebrandt ‘[w]hat we need is an intelligent interplay 
between technological design and legal regulation, with a keen eye to market forces and 
business models as they will fit in with such design and regulation’.365  
 
4.2 PROBLEMS WITH COOKIE NOTICES 
Transparency, though an important principle, is also surrounded by criticism. Koivisto has 
stated that ‘we live in the era of transparency’, everything should be transparent from state 
governance to society itself, thus transparency is ‘the New Norm’ of the modern civilisation.366 
The author has criticised the concept for being ambiguous and lacking a uniform definition.367 
Maybe this is the reason why the EU legislators did not provide a definition of transparency in 
the GDPR.  
 
It could be argued that the reason why transparency is important in modern society is because 
as a notion ‘its promise of letting us see and understand is seductive’.368 Arguably, if people 
understand how those in power exercise this privilege, they can be held more easily 
accountable and thus ensure that power is not abused. Therefore, as Koivisto has stated the 
‘idea is that transparency makes power visible and, as such, controllable’.369 Nevertheless, 
though transparency seems to be an important feature in today’s global governance, as it has 
an ‘inherent capability of exposing the “truth”’,370 it might not necessarily be efficient. This is 
supported by Koivisto, who has argued that just because we see, does not mean we always 
understand.371 She has also criticised that ‘transparency neither addresses the beholder’s 
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capacity to interpret what she sees nor the target’s capacity to manipulate its representation’.372 
Furthermore, Koivisto is of the opinion that ‘transparency practices do not necessarily check 
power, but can relocate and even produce it’, and therefore according to her ‘transparency is a 
contradictory concept which carries the possibility of non-disclosure in itself’.373 
 
Privacy notices have been criticised by many scholars as being inefficient, since they are hard 
to understand and data subjects do not even read them, hence they are unable to make informed 
decisions regarding the disclosure of their personal data.374 One of the reasons why privacy 
notices have proven to be ineffective is that they revolve around the ‘perfectly rational 
consumer with limitless attention’, which has proven to be a ‘false model of human 
capacity’.375 Instead, human rationality is ‘bounded’, thus our ability to absorb information is 
limited.376 Lindqvist, on the other hand, has argued that ‘the form of automatic communication 
between smart devices makes it difficult to apply fundamental transparency and fairness 
principles’.377 Thus, putting the blame on the technology itself. Carolan has also been very 
critical of the efficiency of privacy notices due to people’s lack of capacity to understand the 
technological complexities of cookies. Hence, he has stated that: 
 
If users struggle with anything more than the most basic functions of remote control for 
their TVs, it is optimistic to expect them to develop an informed understanding of how 
different types of cookies could be implemented on different parts of different websites 
in a way that allows the user’s data to be subject to a variety of different types of 
recording and analysis by a variety of different third parties. /_/ Put simply, there 
appears to be a limit to how much the average user can or will understand technology 
related issues – regardless of the level of information supplied. This obviously calls into 
question the veracity of a strategy that treats information about technology as the 
foundation of consent.378  
 
Therefore, in his opinion, providing better information notices is unlikely to have any 
substantial effect on individual’s understanding about cookies and other online activities, since 
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the online environment is so ‘inherently technological’ that it is an obstacle in itself.379 
Moreover, the internet changes in a fast pace, which makes it difficult not only for individuals, 
but also for service providers to anticipate future uses of the collected personal data.380 In 
addition, he notes that the online actors have adopted a ‘pro-disclosure framing’ of the choice 
whether or not to divulge personal data.381 Thus, ‘this framing will frequently encourage 
agreement and disclosure by, for example, being asked for consent when their attention is 
focused on the benefits and rewards of the proposed course of action, rather than the more 
abstract privacy risks that it may involve’.382 Furthermore, the online industry fosters a feeling 
of togetherness through the emphasis on peer sharing.383 Therefore, Carolan has spoken against 
the use of consent in the online environment, because ‘the fact that the architecture of online 
engagement is under the complete control of a particular party means that there are almost 
ever-present opportunities for users to be subtly or surreptitiously prompted in a desired 
direction’.384 
 
Monteleone has criticised the ineptness of privacy notices as evidenced by studies conducted 
in Europe, which show that ‘they are not effective, at least not concerning the purpose of 
increasing users privacy awareness (risks and rights) nor of encouraging a more responsible 
data disclosure’.385 The studies show also the presence of ‘privacy paradox’, which means that 
despite users becoming increasingly aware and concerned about their online privacy, they do 
not read privacy policies and continue to give away personal data.386 Monteleone suggests that 
the privacy paradox can be cured by implementing privacy by design technology as it 
inherently ‘embeds fundamental privacy principles’.387 Furthermore, she has criticised the 
traditional privacy notices for exposing data subjects to ‘information overload’.388 This means 
that an individual will be overwhelmed by excessive information, hence ‘causing her to skim, 
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freeze, or pick out information arbitrarily’.389 Thus, instead of bombarding data subjects with 
a lot of information companies should focus on providing good information in order to help 
data subjects make informed decisions.390     
 
Though some critics, the more sceptic ones, are in favour of forsaking privacy notices 
altogether and instead have more substantive regulation,391 there are still those who see the 
value of notices and who advocate the use of innovative privacy notices instead of the 
traditional ones.392 For example, despite her criticism, Monteleone is against disowning privacy 
notices and consent altogether and believes that privacy policies can hold power if presented 
in an appropriate manner in the online environment and containing relevant information.393 She 
has stated that ‘we should try understanding the underlying reasons, the actual users’ attitudes 
and behaviours and seek out alternative, innovative and integrated ways to enhance them’.394 
Therefore, she has contended that instead of using traditional privacy notices, which are usually 
in text form and have proven to be inefficient, companies should move on to using ‘innovative 
information notices, like salient alerts and nudges’.395 Privacy nudges are a ‘software that 
essentially sits over your shoulder and provides real-time reminders short on-screen messages 
that the information you’re about to send has privacy implications’.396 She believes that using 
privacy nudges ‘as complementary regulatory tools would seek at encouraging, at nudging a 
privacy-protective behaviour, while preserving the freedom of choice of the users, achieving 
the soft or libertarian paternalism’.397  
 
Another improvement suggested by Monteleone is to use ‘visceral notices’, rather than 
traditional long text formats.398 The aim with visceral notices is to ‘have less text and more 
interaction’ and it has proven to be ‘more successful at electing privacy-protective 
behaviour’.399 Calo has also recommended the use of visceral notices instead of abandoning 
notice method altogether. According to him these types of notices ‘leverage a consumer’s very 
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experience of a product or service to warn or inform’.400 In his view: ‘You can write a lengthy 
privacy policy that few will read, or you can design the website in a way that places the user 
on guard at the moment of collection or demonstrates to the consumer how their data is actually 
being used in practice.’401  
 
An example of visceral notices is using an avatar that runs back and forth at the end of the 
webpage to alert the website visitor of third-party tracking.402 This could be more efficient in 
informing the visitor of tracking than few paragraphs in privacy notices,403 because studies 
have shown that ‘people naturally react more strongly, in a visceral way, to anthropomorphic 
cues’.404 Calo further explains that this type of notice ‘attempts to create the relevant state of 
awareness in a sense directly’, instead of using language to communicate,405 because ‘[l]ike 
language, experience has the capability of changing … our understandings and assumptions 
about a given product, environment, or system’.406 Tene and Polonetsky have also stated that 
visceral notice ‘seeks to elicit an emotional or intuitive reaction based on a perception that a 
given practice is desirable or not’.407  
 
Calo acknowledges also the drawbacks of visceral notices, which include the fact that they may 
contain ‘less actionable information’ than written text.408 Hence, he suggests a combination of 
visceral notice for consumers and traditional written policy directed at, inter alia, experts, 
regulators and journalists, who may understand the technical details better.409 According to 
Calo, this ‘two-track system … could combat the assumption that consumers had read and 
agreed to longer terms, and yet preserve the advantages of transparency’.410  
 
Even though the ‘psychology literature offers ample evidence that the provision of information 
does little to enhance user understanding of how technologies of any level of complexity 
operate’,411 privacy notices are still a popular method for regulators to use in privacy and data 
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protection framework.412 This is because policymakers favour the use of notices instead of 
adopting regulations restricting conduct, which is a more invasive option and can in turn hold 
back innovation.413  
 
Calo has argued that, though, privacy notices have largely been deemed unsuccessful in the 
online context, ‘the nature of digital services means that viable regulatory alternatives are few 
and poor’.414 The advantage with privacy notice is that it is ‘relatively cheap to implement and 
easy to enforce’, hence it does not impose a great burden on regulator’s resources.415 
Additionally, privacy notice does not prevent innovation and competition and it ‘purports to 
respect the basic autonomy of the consumer or citizen by arming her with information and 
placing the ultimate decision in her hands’.416 Hence, turning away from privacy notices 
completely might not constitute any better course of action. Calo argues that instead of giving 
up on notices legislators and industry should ‘innovate around notice’ and ‘assess the results 
of such innovation’.417 
 
The failure of privacy notices can also be traced to the phenomenon of ‘transparency 
paradox’.418 This occurs because privacy notices must be sufficiently detailed in order to make 
the data subject informed about the data processing purposes and methods, but this tends to 
result in long and complicated privacy statements, which are instead ignored by data 
subjects.419 On the other hand, short and summarised privacy notices lack enough details to 
provide data subjects with enough facts so he or she can make an informed decision whether 
or not to consent.420 This paradox could potentially be reduced by using privacy notices where 
the text is presented in a layered form, as has been emphasised by the WP29.421 Nevertheless, 
it can still be difficult to fulfil requirements of both detailed and easy to understand information.  
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People’s interest in cookie policies and practices can be paralleled with people’s interest in 
their data protection by looking at whether there has been a significant increase in complaints 
to data protection authorities and whether people have started to read privacy notices over the 
past year. The European Commission published on 25 January 2019 an infographic on GDPR 
compliance and enforcement.422 The infographic shows that since the GDPR came into force 
95 180 queries and complaints have been lodged to data protection authorities by individuals 
or organisations taking action on behalf of data subjects. The lodged complaints concerned 
mainly telemarketing, promotional emails and video surveillance.  
 
Nearing the first year-anniversary of the GDPR the European Commission published on 22 
May 2019 another infographic on GDPR compliance and enforcement.423 The infographic 
shows that the lodged complaints to data protection authorities had increased to a total of 
144 376. It can be seen that people’s interest and activity had increased a lot even within five 
months, which can be taken as a positive sign that people are more engaged in monitoring and 
alerting any misuse of their personal data. Hence, it is possible that people will also be more 
mindful and engaged in the future with respect to cookie practices. The drawback with this 
infographic is, however, that it does not show how many complaints were lodged under the 
Data Protection Directive. Thus, though this number of lodged complaints under the GDPR 
seems big, there is no comparison as to what the number was in the pre-GDPR era and hence, 
whether it has increased or decreased.  
 
The Special Eurobarometer shows that there has been an increase in people’s reading of privacy 
notices.424 The study shows that 60% of the respondents, who use the internet, read website’s 
privacy statements, though mainly partially. Only 13% read the privacy statements completely. 
Interestingly, however, the study also revealed that compared to the 2015 study, people are 
now less likely to read privacy statements, whether partially or fully.425 The main reason for 
not reading privacy statements fully or at all is that people find them too long (66%) and 
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complex or unclear (31%). Some people (15%), on the other hand, believe that the law will 
come to their rescue anyhow.426  
 
Additionally, the study shows that 56% of social network users have attempted to change their 
privacy settings, but this proportion has also slightly decreased compared to 2015.427 The 
reasons for not changing privacy settings are mainly that the users either trust that the social 
network will have adequate privacy settings in place or that they do not know how to change 
the default settings.428 It is interesting that despite all the promotion of the GDPR,429 people’s 
activity in terms of reading privacy policies or changing their privacy settings have decreased 
slightly from the period when data protection was not yet a hot topic. It could, however, be 
inferred that this is because people trust the new legislation will protect them better and so they 
do not have to exercise supervision as actively anymore.  
 
4.3 SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES WITH COOKIE CONSENTS AND 
NOTICES  
It is quite inevitable that users will have to sacrifice, at least to a certain extent, their personal 
data when entering the internet, since many website services are fuelled by personal data and 
the internet has basically become a necessity in the modern developed world. From the 
discussion above, however, it can be seen that there are numerous issues with consent and 
notice, especially in the online environment. These issues are summarised below.  
 
i) Information Asymmetry: Users are rarely aware of how companies use their data.  
ii) Transaction Costs: Users do not read privacy and cookie notices as they tend to be 
lengthy, difficult to understand and unclear. Hence, familiarising themselves with 
the information would be too time consuming.  
iii) User’s Bounded Rationality and Skewed Decision Making: People’s rationality is 
limited, and their decision making is influenced by biases, rules of thumbs, 
heuristics and other factors. Hence, users are not equipped to make rational choices.  
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iv) The Problem of Scale: Internet users are exposed to too many consent requests, 
which makes privacy management on various websites difficult for them to handle 
due to lack of time and resources. 
v) The Aggregation Effect: User’s data given in isolation can later be combined and 
the aggregate of these combined data can reveal new or sensitive information.  
vi) Technological Complexity of the Internet and Cookies: The internet and cookie 
technology are so complex that people lack understanding despite being informed 
through privacy and cookie notices. 
vii) Privacy Paradox: Despite being aware of privacy risks people still continue to 
disclose their personal data online.  
viii) Transparency Paradox: It is difficult to make privacy and cookie information both 
clear and reader friendly and at the same time comprehensive in order to enable the 
user to make an informed decision on whether or not to consent. 
ix) Network Effect: People are reluctant to leave big online social communities 
regardless of privacy risks, since all their friends and peers are there. Furthermore, 
similar alternative services might not exist in the online environment, especially 
when it comes to the popular ones, like Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn.  
 
Due to all of these listed issues with consent and notice, it has therefore been argued that 
‘consent is a burdensome mechanism to use in the online environment and may be seen as 
losing the conditions of validity’.430 This supports the first hypothesis of this thesis that consent 
and notice practices under the current data protection framework do not provide effective 
control and protection to individuals when processing personal data obtained via internet 
cookies. Consequently, the traditional model of consent and notice system might not always 
be the appropriate tool for processing data obtained through cookies. Nevertheless, at the 
moment it is difficult to see that consent would be removed as the legal basis for cookies as it 
is so enshrined in the legal culture of data protection.  
 
This thesis is not, however, of the opinion that consent should be disregarded altogether with 
respect to cookies, but the consent and notice mechanism should be improved in order to be 
more efficient. For example, different types of cookies could better benefit from having 
different legal basis, instead of pushing for one legal basis for all types of cookies. This thesis 
 
430 Betkier (n 353) 36. 
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does see the value in consent in certain circumstances, such as with respect to analytics, 
tracking and behavioural advertising cookies provided that the user or visitor is properly 
informed. Cookies, which are necessary for the functioning of the website, might benefit from 
another legal basis, for example, the legitimate interest, or even legal obligation, especially 
with respect to cookies used for combatting abuse and fraud. Instead of providing a long list of 
different cookie purposes for which user’s consent is needed, regardless if this is provided in a 
granular form, it would be better to narrow down those cookies that should actually be 
subjected to consent. This could already help improving data subject’s understanding of what 
he or she is consenting to and thus facilitate valid informed consent.  
 
The issue with third parties placing cookies on user’s terminal equipment is that they are silent 
partners hiding in the shadows. Thus, though the user could reasonably expect that the website 
he or she is visiting might track his or her movements whilst being on that website, it is not 
reasonable to expect that the user would know or be aware of all the silent partners that might 
also be tracking him or her, especially across multiple domains.  
 
This thesis argues that the cookie notice should explain better what behavioural advertising 
means in practice as users might not understand that personalised advertisement is the result of 
tracking their behaviour and preferences on the internet. Furthermore, with respect to third 
party advertising cookies, it should be explained to the users that they are tracked across 
multiple websites by the same advertising network agency, in order to see what they are 
interested in, which in turn enables the provision of personalised advertisement. This would 
alert the users that they are being monitored by the same entity even on different websites.  
 
If websites adopt Calo’s example of visceral avatar notice, then the third party advertising 
agency could use the same avatar on all those websites it has an agreement with. This would 
provide a more visual notice to the user and inform him or her as to which advertising network 
is monitoring him or her on that specific website. If the advertising network agency has high 
privacy protective features and becomes known for it, then the avatar could serve as, or become 
similar to a trademark for its data protection features. Thus, though traditional privacy notices 
have been deemed inefficient, there is also room for improvement for more innovative notices, 
rather than discarding notice method completely. 
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 Cookie Consents and Notices in Practice 
Different technological means can be used to obtain consent for cookies and the WP29 has 
recognised that website operators are free to choose the practical implementation best suited 
for them and their target audience.431 The important thing is that ‘consent can be deemed as 
valid under EU legislation’.432 This chapter will provide practical examples of how different 
websites from the legal and public sector present their cookie consent requests, in order to 
analyse whether or not they fulfil the consent requirements under the EU data protection 
regime. Of course, the consent mechanisms will diverge depending on what type of cookies 
are used and for what purposes. The thesis will not provide an in-depth analysis of the full 
cookie notices. Instead, the analysis will focus more on the short text supplementing the cookie 
consent request, as this tends to be the first information that users see with respect to cookies. 
 
5.1 NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES  
5.1.1 The UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen from Figure 1, the cookie consent request for the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(hereafter the ‘ICO’), which is the UK’s independent data protection authority,433 pops-up from 
the left of the website. Users can also view it again by clicking on the ‘C’ icon, thus making it 
 
431 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 2. 
432 ibid. 
433 see ‘Information Commissioner’s Office’ (12 February 2020) <https://ico.org.uk/> accessed 17 February 
2020. 
Figure 1. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) - Cookie Consent Request 
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easy for users to change their minds with respect to consenting to analytics cookies. 
Furthermore, the slider is by default on ‘Off’ mode, hence corresponding to Recital 32 of the 
GDPR and the CJEU’s judgment in Planet49, where pre-ticked boxes were rejected as 
constituting valid consent. In order for analytics cookies to be placed on the user’s device the 
user must actively set it on ‘On’ mode. The ICO explains also briefly the differences between 
necessary and analytics cookies and the accept button is clearly set beside the explanation of 
the analytics cookies. This will make it easier for the user to understand that his or her consent 
will only affect the analytics cookies and not necessary cookies. The full cookie notice can be 
found from behind the ‘Cookies page’ hyperlink under ‘Our use of cookies’ and in the footer 
of the website.434 Thus, the ICO has provided visible information and easy access to it.  
 
One criticism is, however, that though the ICO states that necessary cookies can be disabled 
through browser settings, it does not provide any further advice on where or how to do this. 
This information can, however, be found from the full cookie notice. This thesis argues that it 
would be clearer if the information about the necessary cookies would also refer to the 
hyperlink or have a brief explanation on how or where to change the browser settings. On the 
other hand, since this concerns necessary cookies and Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
has exempted these types of cookies from consent, it is argued that this is not a big offence.  
 
Another criticism is that the user must make a choice to either leave the slider on its default 
position or change it and then click on ‘Save and close’, before the user can continue using the 
website. This could be considered as a mild version of cookie walls, as the user is forced to 
make a choice. On the other hand, the user has a real choice on whether or not to accept the 
cookie analytics. Additionally, this seems to provide only little disturbance on user experience 
as the user can just click on ‘Save and close’ immediately, in which case no analytics cookies 
are installed as this is the default position. This conforms with the WP29’s opinion that cookie 
consent request ‘should not be unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which the 
consent is provided’.435 All in all, the ICO seems to have a valid cookie consent mechanism in 
place with prior and clear accessible information at least with respect to analytics cookies.   
 
434 see ICO’s cookie notice from ‘Cookies’ (8 January 2020) <https://ico.org.uk/global/cookies/> accessed 3 
March 2020. 
435 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 16 
original emphasis. 
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5.1.2 Belgium  
 
Figure 2. Autorité de la protection des données - Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit (APD-GBA) - Cookie 
Consent Request 
As seen from Figure 2, the Belgian data protection authority (hereafter the ‘APD-GBA’) has a 
cookie pop-up screen in the middle of the website, with a brief explanation about the necessary 
and analytics cookies.436 The APD-GBA seems to also use a mild level of cookie walls, since 
a user cannot continue to the website until he or she actively clicks on either ‘Agree’ or 
‘Decline’ button. It should be noted, however, that neither button is highlighted, hence 
providing a fairer choice, than other websites who use highlighted ‘accept’ buttons, because 
arguably data subject’s eyes tend to register to the highlighted button first and hence he or she 
might be subconsciously influenced to click on that button.  
 
The modal dialogue box includes a hyperlink for more information about cookies, however, 
there is no cookie policy in the footer of the website, only a privacy statement. The cookie 
policy can be found from within the privacy statement, but it does take some navigation to find 
it. Hence, the information is no longer easily accessible after the choice whether or not to 
consent to cookies has been made. Furthermore, it is difficult to find the choice mechanism 
again in case the user changes his or her mind. The APD-GBA does not provide an option for 
the user to disable the necessary cookies unlike the ICO. But, since necessary cookies are 
exempted from consent, this does not violate the ePrivacy Directive. Thus, the Belgian data 
protection authority seems to provide a valid consent mechanism, except for the accessible 
information, which should be prominent even after the choice has been made.437  
 
436 see ‘Data Protection Authority’ <https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/> accessed 17 February 2020. 
437 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 
43) para 11. 
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5.1.3 Sweden  
 
Figure 3. Datainspektionen - Cookie Consent Request 
Figure 3 shows the bottom of the website for the Swedish data protection authority.438 The 
cookie text states that the data protection authority uses cookies and the visitor chooses whether 
he or she accepts them. The text continues with a link to further information highlighted in red. 
Though, the information informs the visitor that it is up to him or her to accept the cookies it 
does not provide any ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ button immediately after, or in close proximity to 
the text, nor does it provide information on where to change the cookie settings. Furthermore, 
the cookie information is displayed with quite small text in black on the bottom of the website, 
hence it is not very eye catching and instead blends quite easily in there. There is another 
hyperlink for cookie information in red (‘Användning av kakor’) under the header for 
information about the data protection authority. Though, this is in red so are the other 
hyperlinks, thus blending in as well.  
 
There does not seem to be any prior consent mechanism in the first place, therefore it is in 
conflict with Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. The full cookie policy does, however, 
contain information on how to change browser settings to reject cookies. Thus, it could be 
argued that this website uses an opt-out model, which is no longer acceptable under the revised 
Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. Hence, the Swedish data protection authority has failed 
to comply with the EU cookie rules. 
 
 
 
438 see Datainspektionen, ‘Datainspektionen’ <https://www.datainspektionen.se/> accessed 3 March 2020. 
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5.1.4 Spain 
 
Figure 4. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) - Cookie Consent Request 
Figure 4 shows the header of the website of the Spanish data protection authority (hereafter the 
‘AEPD’).439 It uses a pop-up banner with a brief statement that the website uses its own cookies 
for technical purposes only and contains links to third party websites, who will ask separate 
consents when accessing them. The AEPD has only an ‘accept’ button and no ‘decline’ button, 
hence users do not really have any other choice but to accept the technical cookies. This would 
not constitute valid consent, since at least the element of ‘freely given’ is absent.  
 
Technical cookies can, however, be considered necessary to enable the proper functioning of 
the website and therefore be exempted from the consent requirement under the ePrivacy 
Directive. On the other hand, since the data subject’s consent will not really have any impact, 
it is questionable whether consent should be asked in the first place if no real choice is given. 
In this case consent does not seem to be the appropriate legal basis. Alternatively, it should be 
made clear that these types of cookies do not even require user’s consent under EU law.  
5.1.5 France  
The French data protection authority’s website (hereafter the ‘CNIL’)440 seems to have a 
detailed consent request mechanism for third party cookies as seen from Figure 5. The website 
does not seem to use any pop-up banner, instead the user must click on ‘Cookies Management’ 
up on the right corner or in the footer. This provides an easy access for changing the cookie 
settings. It also provides a brief explanation about the third party cookies used by the website 
and the user can choose to accept or decline all third party cookies at once or service by service. 
This allows the user to decide which purposes it accepts and which it refuses, hence enabling 
specific and free consent based on prior information. Neither the ‘Allow’ or ‘Deny’ button is 
 
439 see ‘Agencia Española de Protección de Datos | AEPD’ <https://www.aepd.es/es> accessed 17 February 
2020. 
440 see ‘Homepage | CNIL’ <https://www.cnil.fr/en/home> accessed 17 February 2020. 
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highlighted, though they have different colours (blue and red respectively). Therefore, it can 
be argued that the user is free from influence.  
 
The default position seems to be that third party cookies are denied, unless the user consents, 
since the text states that ‘[i]f you give your consent’, thus adopting a prior op-in consent 
method. There is a link to further information at the end of the modal dialogue box. The method 
seems to be conforming with all of the requirements for a valid consent. Apparently the CNIL 
does not use any first party cookies as it only mentions third party sites.  
 
Figure 5. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) - Cookie Consent Request 
5.1.6 Conclusion  
The above examples have demonstrated that there is some inconsistency in cookie practices 
among the national data protection authorities. This can of course depend to a certain extent on 
the differences in national implementations of the ePrivacy Directive. Nevertheless, these 
examples show that there seems to be some ambiguity with respect to the consent exemptions, 
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especially regarding cookies that are considered necessary for the website’s functioning. For 
example, the Spanish website provided an (ineffective) accept button for them, while others 
did not, and though the UK did not ask for consent, as necessary cookies are exempted from 
consent under the ePrivacy Directive, it did provide an opportunity to disable them, while 
others did not.  
 
This thesis argues that only the UK and France and maybe Belgium could be considered fully 
compliant with the cookie rules under the EU with respect to the type of cookies used. Due to 
the inconsistency, however, it can be argued that the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive have 
not succeeded in providing clear cookie rules and bringing harmonization, thus supporting the 
second hypothesis of this thesis. Hence, better clarification is needed, since even data 
protection authority websites struggle with cookie compliance. Furthermore, if the Member 
States are not in consensus of what constitutes the correct cookie practices under the EU data 
protection laws, then this will be very onerous on the companies, who must tailor their cookie 
practices in accordance with all the national laws where they operate their websites. This 
practice is neither business friendly nor effective.  
 
5.2 LAW FIRMS  
5.2.1 Roschier  
 
Figure 6. Roschier - Cookie Consent Request 
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The law firm Roschier seems to also use a mild version of a cookie wall.441 The cookie text 
pops-up in the middle of the website and user must click on ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ button before 
he or she can continue to the website. The ‘accept’ button is highlighted, which can provide an 
unfair image, as the website seems to be trying to direct the user to accept the cookies. 
Necessary cookies are locked, which is acceptable, since they are allowed without user’s 
consent under the ePrivacy Directive Article 5(3). The request for consent seems to, however, 
cover even these cookies, because the text states that ‘If you choose not to accept our use of 
cookies, some parts of the web site may not function as well.’ It is doubtful that refusal of 
statistics cookies would affect the functioning of the website. This is further clarified in the full 
cookie notice, which states that refusal of strictly necessary cookies will prevent the proper 
functioning of the website. The user does not, however, have real choice with respect to the 
necessary cookies, since the choice is locked. Instead of referring to necessary cookies in the 
consent request, the text should make it clear that these cookies are allowed under EU law. 
 
The user has a choice with respect to the statistics cookies and the purpose is separated from 
the necessary cookies. The box is not pre-ticked and thus it requires user’s active input. Hence, 
Roschier seems to meet the conditions of valid consent under the GDPR with respect to the 
statistics cookies. Another criticism, however, is that the cookie notice is embedded in the 
Privacy Notice. The cookie notice is, however, easy to find from the privacy notice as it is 
layered, and the cookie notice has its own heading. Nevertheless, the website could consider 
providing the cookie policy its own hyperlink in the footer, in order to make it more accessible. 
In conclusion, the consent request for the statistics cookies seems to comply with the 
requirements of valid consent. The text regarding the necessary cookies should, however, be 
clarified.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
441 see ‘Roschier - Leading Law Firm in the Nordic Region’ (Roschier) <https://www.roschier.com/> accessed 
17 February 2020. 
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5.2.2 Hannes Snellman 
 
Figure 7. Hannes Snellman - Cookie Consent Request 
The website of the law firm Hannes Snellman442 uses layered information and granular choice 
in its cookie consent request that pops-up from the bottom of the website. The user can read 
more about the different cookies by surfing the left column, thus the requirement of being 
informed is complied with. The full cookie policy is found from behind the link in the footer 
of the website and the user can change the consent settings from there as well, hence making 
it easy for the user in case he or she has a change of heart.  
 
The cookie consent mechanism conforms also with the requirement of specific consent as the 
different purposes are separated and the user can choose which he or she accepts. It should be 
noted, however, that all of the different purposes are automatically ticked, hence the user must 
deselect them in order to not consent. This is disapproved under Recital 32 of the GDPR and 
would not be considered a valid consent after the decision by the CJEU in the Planet49 case, 
as discussed above. The necessary cookies are locked on this website and though acceptable, 
because they are exempted from the consent requirement under the ePrivacy Directive, this 
thesis thinks that the text could clarify this.  
 
442 see ‘Hannes Snellman - Home’ <https://www.hannessnellman.com/> accessed 17 February 2020. 
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5.2.3 Bird & Bird  
 
Figure 8. Bird & Bird - Cookie Consent Request 
In contrast to the two law firms above, the multinational law firm Bird & Bird provides a very 
brief pop-up text in the footer of its website.443 The site does not, however, ask for any consent. 
It merely provides a ‘Continue’ button and a link to further information. Clicking on the link 
to further information will not constitute consent as has been clarified by the WP29.444 
Furthermore, merely continuing on the website does not constitute consent either.445 It is 
inferred that the website uses an opt-out method, because no consent is requested and the full 
privacy and cookie policy states that ‘On your first visit to this website you will have seen a 
pop-up to inform you about the purposes for which cookies are being used and the means to 
opt-out.’446 Thus, this website is in conflict with Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, which 
requires prior opt-in consent. This website has also embedded cookie policy into its privacy 
notice. The text would be clearer and easier to navigate if it offered layered information or a 
separate cookie notice.  
5.2.4 Borenius 
 
Figure 9. Borenius - Cookie Consent Request 
 
443 see ‘Bird & Bird - International Law Firm’ (Bird & Bird) <http://www.twobirds.com/> accessed 17 February 
2020. 
444 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining 
Consent for Cookies’ (n 42) 5. 
445 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 
15–16; Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 66. 
446 see ‘Cookies Policy’ (Bird & Bird) <http://www.twobirds.com/en/more-information/cookies-policy> 
accessed 27 April 2020. 
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The law firm Borenius uses a similar method as Bird & Bird,447 as it has also a brief pop-up 
text in the footer, which explains that cookies are used to ‘collect statistic about our visitors 
and help us analyse how the site is used’. No consent is asked, only an ‘OK’ button is provided. 
This can be acceptable if the data is anonymized, as such data falls outside the scope of the 
GDPR. In fact, Recital 26 of the GDPR has stated explicitly that anonymous information used 
for statistical purposes falls outside its scope. Thus, in this case the law firm does not need to 
ask for consent. Nevertheless, the text at hand could be made clearer by including a statement 
that the website collects only anonymous data. This is explained in the full privacy notice, 
which incorporates information on cookies as well. A separate cookie notice would be 
recommended, or the use of layered information in the privacy notice, since at the moment it 
takes some navigation to find the cookie information.  
5.2.5 Deloitte 
 
Figure 10. Deloitte - Cookie Consent Request 
The law firm Deloitte448 has a pop-up banner in the header which states, among others, that 
‘By using this site you agree to our use of cookies.’ This is accompanied by a highlighted 
‘Accept and close’ button, but no reject option as seen from Figure 10. Such practice has been 
disapproved by the WP29,449 as mentioned above and this does not really give the user any real 
choice with respect to the use of cookies and therefore does not provide a valid consent. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the CJEU in Planet49 confirmed that consent must be 
separate from another act.450 Hence, the act of continuing surfing the website cannot at the 
same time indicate consent to the use of cookies.451 It is, however, possible that this text covers 
only the necessary cookies, since the pop-up banner does provide a link to ‘Cookie Settings’.  
 
The cookie settings, as seen from Figure 11 and 12, provide a more detailed consent option, 
layered information and the possibility to consent to separate purposes one by one or all at 
 
447 see ‘Borenius’ (Borenius) <https://www.borenius.com/> accessed 17 February 2020. 
448 see ‘Deloitte | Audit, Consulting, Financial, Risk Management, Tax Services’ (Deloitte) 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en.html> accessed 17 February 2020. 
449 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 144) 
15–16. 
450 Planet49 (n 174) para 58-59; see also Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 66. 
451 Planet49 (n 174) para 58-59; see also Opinion of AG Szpunar in Planet49 (n 71) para 66. 
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once.  The strictly necessary cookies are ‘Always Active’, as seen from Figure 11. Hence, the 
text in the pop-up banner might refer to these cookies only, because the other cookies are by 
default on ‘inactive’ mode (see Figure 12 for an example). Therefore, Deloitte applies an opt-
in consent system for other than necessary cookies (which might not need consent in the first 
place). The cookie settings provide an immediate and clear advice on where the user can go 
and change his or her preferences. The cookie notice is also in the footer of the website and the 
full text provides a link to the cookie settings. Hence, the information and the cookie settings 
are at all times easily available. The cookie consent mechanism seems to comply with the 
consent requirements, though even Deloitte could clarify that the necessary cookies are 
permissible without user’s consent under EU law and therefore they can be installed.   
 
Figure 11. Deloitte - Cookie settings - Necessary cookies 
 
Figure 12. Deloitte - Cookie settings - Targeting cookies  
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5.2.6 Conclusion  
The above examples show that there is also some inconsistency of cookie practices among law 
firms and at least one of them had incorporated an opt-out method, which is no longer 
acceptable under Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. Furthermore, only three law firms 
provided the recommended layered information on their website. It is argued that possibly three 
of the above examined law firms (Roschier, Borenius and Deloitte) could pass the consent test.  
 
This thesis is of the opinion that the cookie rules are not sufficiently clear and harmonised, 
since even law firms apply them inconsistently and struggle with compliance, thus supporting 
the second hypothesis of this thesis. The fact that law firms in Finland apply different cookie 
practices may very well result in the giving of different advices to companies and organisations 
on cookie policies and practices within the country. Hence, it is important that cookie rules are 
clarified so that law firms can also give better legal advice to their customers. 
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 The Future of Cookie Legislation  
EU citizens, consumers and civil society organisations have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the ePrivacy Directive in a public consultation conducted by the European Commission in 
2016.452 Their dissatisfaction concerned, among others, the inconsistent interpretation and 
enforcement of the ePrivacy Directive due to differences in national implementations.453 This 
supports the second hypothesis of this thesis that the ePrivacy Directive has failed to harmonise 
the rules on cookie consent. Additionally, the respondents were also critical of cookie rules, 
which in their opinion did not provide sufficient protection as ‘consumers are not offered real 
choice to accept cookies’.454 This in essence supports the first hypothesis of this thesis that 
cookie consent rules under the current data protection framework do not provide effective 
control and protection to individuals when processing personal data obtained via internet 
cookies. Hence, consent might not always be the appropriate legal basis for processing data 
obtained via cookies, especially if the ensuing control is illusory.  
 
The proposed ePrivacy Regulation is hopefully going to bring better clarity and harmonisation 
with respect to the processing of data in the electronic communications sectors, including the 
use of cookies. The first draft of the ePrivacy Regulation was adopted on 10 January 2017,455 
with the intention to replace the ePrivacy Directive and thus become a lex specialis legislation 
to the GDPR. The proposal has, however, undergone many revisions during the different EU 
Council Presidencies and has not yet been passed, as the Member States struggle to reach an 
agreement.456 Thus, it has been speculated that its enactment might be pushed to even 2023.457  
 
6.1 COOKIE WALLS 
The Finnish Presidency’s amended draft version of the ePrivacy Regulation was adopted on 15 
November 2019, but this has also been rejected.458 One of the disagreements in this draft 
proposal between the Member States concerned cookie walls and ‘the need not to undermine 
 
452 see ‘Synopsis Report of the Public Consultation on the Evaluation and Review of the EPrivacy Directive’ 
(European Commission 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/full-report-public-
consultation-eprivacy-directive> accessed 18 September 2019. 
453 ibid 2. 
454 ibid. 
455 ePrivacy Regulation draft January 2017 (n 13). 
456 see for example ‘EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 14) and; ‘EU EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 14). 
457 ‘EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 14). 
458 Jennifer Baker, ‘How the EPrivacy Regulation Talks Failed ... Again’ (26 November 2019) 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/how-the-eprivacy-regulation-failed-again/> accessed 29 November 2019. 
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existing business models’.459 The draft text was criticised for not providing sufficient data 
protection to individuals and instead supporting online ad networks and facilitating the 
monopoly exercised by big tech companies.460 Cookie walls, also called ‘tracking walls’, 
require website visitors to accept cookies used by the website (this may also include third party 
cookies) or otherwise they will be denied access to the website’s service.461 Thus, cookie walls 
provide a take-it-or-leave-it type of choice, which has been criticised by the WP29 and legal 
academics as seen above.462 The WP29 has recommended that cookie walls be banned under 
the ePrivacy Regulation as these kind of practices are ‘rarely legitimate’,463 and they would not 
satisfy the condition of ‘freely given’ consent under the GDPR.464 
 
Carolan criticised the older forms of consent under the Data Protection Directive and the 
ePrivacy Directive and contended that ‘The fact, for example, that the exercise of the right to 
withhold consent could sometimes result in a denial of access to the service in question left the 
user with a take-it-or-leave it choice of questionable voluntariness or value.’465 Other critics 
have also claimed that it is ‘debatable whether people have meaningful control over personal 
information if they have to consent to tracking to be able to use services or websites’.466 Thus, 
they recommended that cookie walls be banned at least partially or even completely.467  
 
Furthermore, the Eurobarometer survey conducted in July 2016 showed that the majority of 
the respondents (64%) did not think it was acceptable that companies monitor their online 
behaviour in exchange for free website content.468 This thesis is of the opinion that the EU 
legislators should seriously consider to prohibit cookie walls altogether as a general rule and if 
necessary to make strict exceptions to this rule, as it seems unfair to force user’s hand to click 
 
459 ibid. 
460 ibid. 
461 Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius and others, ‘Tracking Walls, Take-It-or-Leave-It Choices, the GDPR, and 
the EPrivacy Regulation’ (2017) 3 European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL) 353, 355 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/edpl3&i=382> accessed 31 March 2020. 
462 see for example Zuiderveen Borgesius and others (n 461); Carolan (n 46). 
463 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 01/2017on the Proposed Regulation for the EPrivacy 
Regulation (2002/58/EC)’ (adopted on 4 April 2017) WP 247 15 
<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=610140> accessed 20 February 2020. 
464 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the Evaluation and Review of the EPrivacy 
Directive (2002/58/EC)’ (adopted on 19 July 2016) WP 240 16 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp240_en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020. 
465 Carolan (n 46) 465. 
466 Zuiderveen Borgesius and others (n 461) 353. 
467 ibid 368. 
468 European Commission, ‘Flash Eurobarometer 443: E-Privacy, Full Report’ (2016) Question 5.1 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eurobarometer-eprivacy> accessed 31 March 2020. 
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on the cookie ‘accept’ button. Furthermore, since consent to cookie walls could not be 
considered valid under the GDPR as it is not given freely, they also fail to provide effective 
control and protection to internet users. This in turn is against the whole spirit of the EU’s data 
protection regime, since its purpose is to protect user’s personal data and bestow upon users 
increased control over their personal data.469  
 
6.2 LEGITIMATE INTEREST  
The Croatian Presidency is the new successor to take on the challenges of the ePrivacy 
Regulation in 2020.470 It has released a revised draft of the ePrivacy Regulation on 21 February 
2020 with substantial amendments to Articles 6 and 8 concerning the processing of metadata 
and use of cookies respectively.471 It has not, however, addressed the issue of cookie walls in 
this revised draft, hence this issue remains. One of the pivotal suggestions472 made by the 
Croatian Presidency is to enable controllers to rely on the legitimate interest legal basis when 
1) processing electronic communications’ metadata and 2) installing cookies on website user’s 
devices, provided that additional conditions and safeguards are put in place.473 These additional 
safeguards include: a) completing an impact assessment and where appropriate consult the 
national data protection authority, b) prohibition to disclose information to third parties (except 
its processors), unless the data has been anonymized, c) implement appropriate security 
measures, and d) inform the user of these processing activities and of the right to object to such 
processing.474 Furthermore, the controller would have to complete a balancing of interest test 
if it intends to use this legal basis.475 This is in accordance with Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.  
 
Recital 21b of the draft ePrivacy Regulation supports the new Article 8(1)(g), which introduces 
the legitimate interest ground for cookies. The recital recognises that ‘maintaining or restoring 
the security of information society services or of the end-user’s terminal equipment, or 
 
469 see for example GDPR Recitals 6, 10 and 108; ePrivacy Directive Recitals 2, 5, 24 and 25. 
470 Baker (n 458). 
471 see Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications 
and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications)’ (2020) 5979/20 
1; ‘EU Council Presidency Releases Proposed Amendments to Draft EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 15). 
472 ‘EU Council Presidency Releases Proposed Amendments to Draft EPrivacy Regulation’ (n 15). 
473 ePrivacy Regulation draft 2020 (n 469) Articles 6b(1)(e) and 8(1)(g); see also Council of the European 
Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for 
private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications)’ (2020) 6543/20 (Consolidated version). 
474 ePrivacy Regulation draft 2020 (n 469) Recital 21c and Articles 8(1a) and 8(1a)(a)-(c). 
475 ibid Recital 21b and Article 8(1)(g). 
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preventing fraud or detecting technical faults might constitute a legitimate interest of the 
service provider’. Similarly, the recital recognises that online newspapers or other services that 
protect the freedom of expression and that are wholly or mainly funded by advertisements 
instead of monetary payment could also rely on the legitimate interest legal basis. The revised 
draft provides also instances when websites cannot rely on the legitimate interest legal basis. 
These include, inter alia, if cookie information is used for profiling purposes or for processing 
sensitive personal data.476 These prohibitions are in line with the GDPR, as legitimate interest 
is not a possible legal basis in these circumstances.477  
 
The EU Council Presidency’s proposal seems to, however, go against the EDBP’s advice 
delivered already in 2018, where it expressed its view against the use of legitimate interest 
ground with respect to the processing of electronic communications data and use of cookies.478 
In its view, this was one of the ‘open-ended grounds’, which should be excluded under the 
ePrivacy Regulation.479 The draft has also received criticism from some data protection 
advocates who see the use of the legitimate interest ground as diminishing the level of data 
protection in the legislation.480 Pirate Party MEP Patrick Breyer has stated that: ‘Corporations 
have no “legitimate interest” in intercepting and exploiting information on our private 
communications and tracking our Internet use. This is none of their business.’481 This thesis 
agrees with Breyer’s statement to the extent that companies should not exploit this ground to 
process personal data extensively, for tracking purposes or beyond what is necessary for their 
legitimate business interests. Hence, it thinks that the legislators should clarify the 
circumstances when legitimate interest can be used and when consent should be used instead. 
 
Borgesius has argued against legitimate interests for cookies used for behavioural targeting.482  
In his opinion, behavioural targeting would not satisfy the necessity and proportionality 
principle linked to the legitimate interest, since contextual advertisement would provide a less 
 
476 ibid. 
477 see GDPR Articles 9(2) and 22(2). 
478 European Data Protection Board, ‘Statement of the EDPB on the Revision of the EPrivacy Regulation and Its 
Impact on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Privacy and Confidentiality of Their 
Communications’ (2018) 1 and 3 <https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/drugi/statement-edpb-
revision-eprivacy-regulation-and-its-impact_en> accessed 7 May 2020. 
479 ibid 1. 
480 Jennifer Baker, ‘Critics on Croatia’s EPrivacy Proposal: Legitimate Interest Provisions Not Legitimate’ (25 
February 2020) <https://iapp.org/news/a/critics-on-croatias-eprivacy-proposal-legitimate-interest-provisions-
not-legitimate/> accessed 7 May 2020. 
481 ibid. 
482 Borgesius (n 47) 168. 
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intrusive means to market products as it does not entail tracking people’s online behaviour.483 
Contextual advertisement means marketing such products or services that fit within the 
website’s content.484 For example, advertising clothes and accessories on websites about 
fashion. Additionally, in his opinion, it is technically possible to conduct behavioural targeting 
without large-scale data collection.485 However, since most ad network agencies are involved 
in this kind of data collection it would not satisfy the legitimate interest ground, because it 
could be considered disproportionate.486  
 
Professor Moerel has also advocated for this interpretation that behavioural targeting across 
websites would not satisfy the balancing of interest tests and hence consent would be more 
appropriate legal basis.487 Nevertheless, in her opinion, ‘collection of data by cookies for 
purposes of website analytics, fraud prevention, legal compliance, first party marketing on the 
site that is visited, should pass the legitimacy test’. 488 However, in contrast to the view of the 
Croatian Presidency, she does seem to be of the opinion that profiling could rely on the 
legitimate interest ground. This is inferred from her statement that states the following: 
‘Personal data may be collected, used (which will include profiling), merged, transferred and 
destroyed if there is a “legitimate interest of the controller which does not outweigh the privacy 
rights of the individuals’”.489 Though, this is subjected to the outcome of the balancing of 
interest test, it is interesting that she thinks that profiling could pass the test but not behavioural 
targeting, although behavioural advertisement is one of the uses of profiling.490 Though, the 
proposed revision does prohibit legitimate interest as a legal basis if the information is used to 
create an individual profile, it does not explicitly mention online tracking or behavioural 
advertising. Thus, it is interesting to see whether this will be clarified in the draft. 
 
 
483 ibid. 
484 see for example ibid. 
485 ibid 168, 169. 
486 ibid. 
487 Lokke Moerel, ‘Big Data Protection: How to Make the Draft EU Regulation on Data Protection Future 
Proof’ (Lecture at Tilburg University, 14 February 2014) 58 <https://www.debrauw.com/wp-
content/uploads/NEWS%20-%20PUBLICATIONS/Moerel_oratie.pdf> accessed 2 March 2020. 
488 ibid. 
489 ibid 55. 
490 see for example Emmanuel Benoist, ‘Collecting Data for the Profiling of Web Users’ in Mireille Hildebrandt 
and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer 
Netherlands 2008) 172; Meike Kamp, Barbara Körffer and Martin Meints, ‘Profiling of Customers and 
Consumers - Customer Loyalty Programmes and Scoring Practices’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth 
(eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer Netherlands 2008) 201; 
Clifford (n 48) 194. 
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Despite the heavy criticism, there are also those who see the positive side in introducing the 
legitimate interest ground, such as Eduardo Ustaran, the Global Co-Head of Hogan Lovells 
Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice. He stated that: 
  
I personally think that after so many years of flawed cookie consent, it is a productive 
thing to do to introduce another approach into the legislative debate. My view is that 
‘legitimate interests’ is misunderstood and underrated as a regulatory mechanism to 
protect our privacy.491  
 
This thesis applauds the EU Council Presidency for introducing a new possible legal basis to 
the use of cookies as consent has been heavily criticized as discussed above and may therefore 
not be the appropriate legal basis for cookies in all circumstances. Whether or not this new 
suggested legal basis for cookies will be able to tackle better the issues surrounding consent 
and provide better control and transparency for users remains to be seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
491 Baker (n 479). 
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 Conclusion 
The internet is a cyber space that enables people to connect and access a lot of free information 
and services in exchange for their personal data. Many websites use cookie technology to 
collect information about their visitors and users. Cookies can be used for multiple purposes, 
such as, remembering user’s preferences, tracking the user’s online behaviour, create online 
user profiles and provide targeted advertisement based on such profiling. Hence, they can be 
privacy invasive.  
 
As data is the ‘world’s most valuable resource’ in the 21st century,492 data protection has 
become a pivotal topic in today’s world and it has received prominence, especially in the EU 
as a result of the GDPR, which imposes high data protection requirements and safeguards. 
Processing of personal data must be lawful as it interferes with the fundamental human rights 
to privacy and data protection established under the Charter. Obtaining data subject’s consent 
is one of the legal bases under Article 6 of the GDPR that legitimizes processing of personal 
data. The EU data protection regime has generally relied on the notion of consent accompanied 
by the principle of transparency as a tool to protect internet user’s data obtained through 
cookies as seen from Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive.  
 
This thesis has examined whether or not the traditional model of consent and notice is the 
appropriate legal basis for cookies and concluded that this might not always be the case. The 
research question was divided into two parts. The first part concerned whether consent and 
notice are an effective tool in providing control and protection to individuals with respect to 
personal data processed through internet cookies. The second part of the research question 
concerned whether the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive provide clear and harmonised rules 
on cookie consents and notices. 
 
In terms of the first question, this thesis has shown that consent and notice, though they might 
be in theory good ideas, do not really work in practice, especially when it comes to website 
cookies. First of all, if consent is not valid, in other words, it does not meet the requirements 
of freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous, then consent is an illusory tool that fails 
 
492 ‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data’ The Economist (6 May 2017)  
<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data> 
accessed 6 May 2020. 
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to give users control over the use of their data. Hence, meeting all of the consent elements can 
be difficult in itself.  
 
Considering the substantial use of the internet in modern society and its significance in people’s 
lives, it could be considered that consent is rarely freely given, since there is always going to 
be an imbalance of power between the internet user and the website provider, especially with 
regard to big corporations like Google and Facebook. Furthermore, users can suffer from social 
pressure or influence due to many of their friends and peers being in the online community, 
sharing and connecting with each other and they do not want to be the odd one left out. It might 
also be difficult to make the consent request specific, since companies themselves might not 
even know what kind of future uses it can make of the collected personal data.  
 
Companies face also difficulties in making clear and comprehensive privacy and cookie notices 
required under the GDPR. Thus, if the information given to data subjects prior to consenting 
is lacking or is difficult to understand, then it is debatable whether the data subject has been 
able to make an informed decision. Furthermore, though the GDPR has clarified that 
unambiguous indication means active behaviour from the data subject, there seems to be some 
websites who still continue with opt-out methods. Moreover, there is some ambiguity between 
the difference of expressing regular consent versus explicit consent.  
 
Secondly, it has been discussed in this thesis that user’s decision making on whether or not to 
consent to the processing of his or her personal data is burdened by many factors including, 
inter alia, user’s bounded rationality, different types of biases, information asymmetry and 
transactions costs, as well as different paradoxes. Furthermore, the technological complexity 
of the internet and cookies is an additional obstacle to user’s capacity to understand and make 
an informed decision. Users are also generally bombarded with so many cookie consent 
requests daily that it has resulted in click fatigue. Therefore, the conclusion to the first part of 
the research question is that cookie consent and notice practices under the current data 
protection framework do not provide effective control and protection to individuals when 
processing personal data obtained via internet cookies.  
 
This thesis is, however, not of the opinion that consent should be disregarded altogether with 
respect to cookies, but that the consent mechanisms should be improved in order to be more 
effective and provide better control. The thesis recognises that cookie consent can be relevant 
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for certain types of cookie usage, such as, analytics and behavioural advertising. Nevertheless, 
the legislators should look into other legal bases as well, such as, the legitimate interest ground, 
especially when it comes to necessary cookies, which are already exempted from consent under 
the ePrivacy Directive.  
 
Legitimate interest could also be used for contextual advertising, in which case the website 
would still gain finance through advertisement, even if the user rejects behavioural advertising 
cookies, but through less invasive means. For behavioural advertising consent might be more 
appropriate, since it is more invasive and thus the user should be able to choose whether he or 
she accepts this kind of processing. Websites should, however, explain clearly what 
behavioural advertisement actually entails in practice, especially with respect to third party 
advertisement. Furthermore, notice methods should be improved, such as, using more layered 
information or even more innovative notices like visceral notices.  
  
With regard to the second question, this thesis has used concrete examples from two sectors, 
in order to show the difference between law in books and law in action. The examples were 
used to show the different interpretations of cookie consents and notices in practice in the legal 
and public sector, despite harmonization attempts by the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive. As 
seen from the practical examples, many websites tend to use cookie consent as a precaution, 
even in cases where consent might not be needed, in other words, where the cookies could fall 
under the consent exemptions, especially with respect to necessary cookies. In these cases, the 
websites have not given much choice to the user but to accept the necessary cookies. Thus, in 
these circumstances it is questionable whether another legal basis might be more suitable, such 
as, the legitimate interest ground. Alternatively, the notice should better clarify that these types 
of cookies are allowed under EU law irrespective of user’s consent.  
 
Around half of the websites examined in this thesis seemed to have consent mechanisms in 
place, which could be considered compliant with the EU data protection laws. The cookie 
practices will inevitably vary depending on what type of cookies are used and for what 
purposes. Nevertheless, the rules on cookie consents and notices seem to lack consistent 
interpretation and understanding even from the legal sector and the national data protection 
authorities.  
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Additionally, as data protection and cookies were previously governed by directives rather than 
regulations one of the reasons for different approaches to cookie consents in Member States 
was that each Member State had to implement the directives on national level. Hence, this 
allowed them more leeway in deciding what kind of cookie consent constituted valid consent 
in their eyes. The GDPR has brought some harmonization due to being directly applicable to 
all EU Member States and it has also clarified the general requirements of consent. 
Nevertheless, as cookies are still governed by a directive, the approach to cookie consent is not 
harmonised, due to differences in national implementations of the ePrivacy Directive. This 
issue can be overcome once the proposed ePrivacy Regulation comes into force as it will be 
directly applicable to all Member States like the GDPR, without the need for any national 
implementation. Nonetheless, the conclusion to the second part of the research question is that 
the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive have failed to harmonise cookie consents and notices.  
 
The proposed ePrivacy Regulation has the opportunity to clarify and facilitate harmonization 
in terms of cookie practices. Nevertheless, many gaps remain open, such as, the lawfulness of 
cookie walls. The newest revised draft by the Croatian Presidency introduced legitimate 
interest as an alternative legal basis for the use of cookies alongside consent. Though, this 
introduction has received criticism, this thesis supports the EU Council Presidency for its 
initiative, especially since consent might not always be the appropriate legal basis for cookies. 
Whether or not the legitimate interest ground will be established as an official alternative legal 
basis to consent for cookies and able to provide better protection and control to internet users 
remains to be seen.  
